In most cases, a person protected by a Washington civil protect order wants the order and limitations it provides. A vulnerable adult protection order, however, is commonly sought by someone else on behalf of the vulnerable person, and in some cases, the allegedly vulnerable person may object to the order. In a recent unpublished case, a man recently challenged a vulnerable adult protection order issued against him.
The petitioner sought a vulnerable adult protection order as attorney for a woman who was over 80 years old and had dementia and other health issues. She alleged the respondent had “abandoned, abused, financially exploited, or neglected” the woman, identifying specific incidents. The petition alleged the respondent had taken the woman from her retirement community to her former home twice, which upset her when she learned the place had been rented. The petitioner also alleged the respondent had given the woman alcohol twice when he was aware she had issues with alcohol abuse. The petitioner provided declarations from herself, the woman’s brother, another of the woman’s relatives, and an agent with a durable power of attorney.
The respondent submitted his own declaration, transcripts of calls with the woman, and two character reference letters.
The court issued a temporary protection order and appointed a guardian ad litem.
Following a virtual hearing, the commissioner entered a four-year vulnerable adult protection order. The commissioner based the determination the woman was “ a vulnerable adult—cognitively and physically” on the guardian ad litem’s report, the declarations, and the testimony. The commissioner found the respondent posted a credible threat to the woman and that his actions “created unsafe conditions for [her].”
The respondent appealed.
The appeals court noted the parties disputed the applicable burden of proof. The respondent argued that the clear, cogent, and convincing evidence standard should apply to a vulnerable adult protection order when the protected person objects. He argued that “a heightened standard of proof is required.”
The petitioner argued that the commissioner should have applied a preponderance of the evidence standard following the revision to RCW 7.105.225. The appeals court determined that RCW 7.105.225 was “unambiguous” and the preponderance of the evidence standard applied. The appeals court did, however, suggest that the court forms be updated to reflect the change.
The respondent argued there was insufficient evidence supporting the court’s finding of “abandonment, abuse, financial exploitation, or neglect.” The appeals court noted he had not challenged the finding the protected person was a vulnerable adult or the finding that his actions created unsafe conditions for her. The appeals court therefore only had to determine if there was substantial evidence supporting the “ultimate finding regarding abandonment, abuse, financial exploitation, or neglect.”
The appeals court looked to the statutory definition of “abuse” and determined there was evidence the respondent’s actions constituted mental abuse. The declarations of the petitioner and the woman’s relatives stated the respondent’s actions had created hostility between the woman and her family, resulting in her isolation. The vulnerable adult protection order stated he “interfered with her family and legal relationships.” The appeals court also noted that the respondent’s actions in providing the woman alcohol or access to alcohol was evidence of physical abuse. The petitioner’s declaration stated the woman had “a history of alcohol abuse” and that she had alcohol poisoning after being found on the Seattle University campus two days after the respondent visited her. The court found the petitioner “has supplied alcohol.” The appeals court concluded there was substantial evidence establishing two separate grounds to support the court’s finding of abandonment, abuse, financial exploitation, or neglect. The appeals court found no abuse of discretion in the commissioner’s ruling.
The respondent argued the court abused its discretion by failing to consider his evidence. The appeals court acknowledged the respondent’s evidence was not expressly listed in the vulnerable adult protection order, but pointed out the commissioner had expressly stated he reviewed all the materials provided by the parties. Additionally, the evidence listed in the vulnerable adult protection order was the evidence the commissioner relied on. The appeals court noted that the fact the respondent’s evidence was not included in the list indicated the commissioner had not credited it, not that he did not consider it.
The respondent also argued that the order was not a “tailored, proportional response” and exceeded the court’s authority. The petitioner argued the guardian ad litem had concluded a “total prohibition on contact. . . was the best solution.” The appeals court noted the guardian ad litem had expressly recommended the court prohibit the respondent from all contact with the protected person. The woman’s brother’s declaration stated he had tried to talk to the respondent “many times” and her other relative said she had changed the woman’s phone number and blocked the respondent. The petitioner testified about the respondent’s efforts to contact the protect person after she got new phone numbers.
The appeals court concluded the evidence established that the protected person’s attorney and family had tried to limit contact, but the respondent still tried to make contact. The trial court based the vulnerable adult protective order on the facts presented and the appeals court found no error.
The appeals court affirmed the order.
Whether you are seeking or opposing a civil protection order, a knowledgeable Washington civil protection order can help. Set up a consultation with Blair & Kim, PLLC by calling (206) 622-6562.