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Not every form of domestic violence leaves a bruise. Washington law has recognized this for several years, and a recent published decision from the Court of Appeals reinforces it: a pattern of controlling, manipulative behavior can be enough to support a domestic violence protection order (DVPO), even when there is no recent physical assault. In Asbach v. Couto, No. 60325-0-II, the court upheld protection orders built largely on coercive control — including a public YouTube video — while also clarifying the limits on what a protection order may restrain.

Short answer: In Washington, a documented pattern of coercive control can support a domestic violence protection order under RCW 7.105.010 — even without a recent physical assault. A court weighs the full pattern of controlling behavior and its impact, not a single incident.

 

If you are weighing whether controlling behavior in your own situation could justify a protection order, this decision is worth understanding. Below, the attorneys at Blair & Kim break down what the court decided, what “coercive control” means under Washington law, and what petitioners across King, Pierce, and Snohomish Counties should take from it.

Thinking about a protection order? Blair & Kim’s civil protection order team helps petitioners across the Seattle and Bellevue area understand their options. You can learn more about protection orders here.

 

What Happened in Asbach v. Couto

The case arose out of a long history between a former couple who divorced in 2012. As part of that divorce, the petitioner obtained a permanent restraining order based on domestic violence, and the parenting plan limited the other party’s contact with the children because of abusive use of conflict. Over the following years, the trial court issued and repeatedly renewed protection orders covering the petitioner and the two children.

After the couple’s son turned 18 and his protection order expired, the father posted a public video to YouTube addressed to the son. In it, he made disparaging statements about the mother. The mother petitioned for a new protection order for herself and to renew the order for the couple’s minor daughter; the now-adult son filed his own petition, citing the video and incidents in which the father appeared at the son’s workplace and at a store where the daughter was present.

The trial court granted the protection orders, finding that the YouTube video and surrounding conduct amounted to coercive control. On appeal, Division II affirmed the orders, holding that substantial evidence supported a finding of coercive control. The court did, however, send one part of the orders back to the trial court — the broad restriction on posting online content — which we discuss further below.

How a Coercive Control Protection Order Works in Washington

Washington’s civil protection order statute defines domestic violence broadly. Under RCW 7.105.010(10)(b), domestic violence includes not only physical harm, bodily injury, assault, and stalking, but also coercive control and unlawful harassment between family or household members.

Coercive control is defined in RCW 7.105.010(4)(a) as a pattern of behavior used to cause another person physical, emotional, or psychological harm that, in purpose or effect, unreasonably interferes with that person’s free will and personal liberty. Importantly, the statute directs courts to consider the context and impact of the pattern of behavior from the perspective of a similarly situated person — not to view any single act in isolation.

That “context” rule was central in Asbach. Standing alone, a YouTube video criticizing a former spouse might not look like domestic violence. But the court declined to view the video in a vacuum. Against a documented history of physical violence, financial control, and emotional manipulation, the video read as a continuation of an established pattern — and that pattern is what the coercive control standard is designed to capture.

The Takeaway on Coercive Control

In Washington, coercive control is a recognized form of domestic violence. Under RCW 7.105.010(4)(a), a court evaluating a protection order petition looks at the full pattern of controlling behavior and its impact — not just a single incident — to decide whether the conduct unreasonably interfered with the petitioner’s free will and personal liberty.

Harm to One Family Member Can Affect the Whole Household

The court also addressed an argument that evidence of domestic violence directed at one family member could not support a protection order for another. Relying on Washington Supreme Court precedent, the court explained that abuse aimed at a parent can constitute domestic violence against a child in the same household — and that this reasoning is not limited to minor children. Here, it extended to an adult child still connected to the household.

For families navigating overlapping protection order, divorce, and custody and parenting plan issues, this is a meaningful point. A pattern of controlling conduct rarely affects only one person. Washington law allows courts to consider how that conduct ripples across an entire household when deciding who needs protection.

Facing overlapping family law and protection order concerns? Blair & Kim handles both family law and domestic violence protection matters, which is especially useful when divorce, custody, and safety issues overlap in the same case.

 

What a Protection Order Can — and Cannot — Restrict

While the court upheld the protection orders, it agreed with one of the father’s arguments: the orders went too far in restricting his future online speech. The orders barred him from posting, sharing, or transmitting any videos or media referring to the petitioner or the children “in any manner whatsoever.” The court held that this sweeping language was not narrowly tailored and raised First Amendment concerns.

The court drew a careful line. Speech that itself constitutes coercive control or another form of domestic violence is not protected, and a court may prohibit it. But an order so broad that it could bar a person from ever mentioning that he was married, had children, or wished to discuss parenting generally swept in protected speech. The court sent that portion back to the trial court to be rewritten more narrowly, while leaving the protection orders themselves — and the requirement to remove the existing video — firmly in place.

For petitioners, the practical lesson is encouraging but precise: Washington courts may restrain abusive communications, including online posts that function as coercive control, when an order is narrowly tailored to that conduct. The restriction simply has to be tailored to the harmful conduct rather than a blanket ban on all speech.

How to Petition for a Protection Order in Washington

If your situation involves coercive control or other domestic violence, Washington law provides a path to seek protection. The general process looks like this:

  1. File a petition. A petition for a domestic violence protection order is typically filed in superior court. In the Seattle area, that usually means King County Superior Court, with petitions in neighboring counties filed in Pierce County or Snohomish County Superior Court.
  2. Document the pattern. Because coercive control turns on a pattern rather than a single act, it helps to gather messages, posts, records, and a timeline showing the controlling behavior and its impact.
  3. Temporary order and hearing. A court may issue a temporary order and set a hearing. At the hearing, the court decides whether to enter a longer-term order.
  4. Standard of proof. The court must find domestic violence by a preponderance of the evidence — more likely than not — to grant the order.

Procedures and local practices vary, and each case turns on its own facts. Working with counsel familiar with the local courts can help you prepare and present your petition.

Frequently Asked Questions

Can I get a protection order in Washington without physical violence?

Yes. Washington’s protection order statute recognizes coercive control and unlawful harassment as forms of domestic violence under RCW 7.105.010. A documented pattern of controlling, manipulative, or threatening behavior can support a DVPO even without a recent physical assault. Each case turns on its own facts, and the court weighs the full context.

What is the standard of proof for a domestic violence protection order?

A court must issue a DVPO if it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the petitioner has been subjected to domestic violence by the respondent. Washington law also makes clear that a court may not deny a petition simply because time has passed since the last incident.

Can a protection order limit what someone posts about me online?

It can, within limits. As Asbach v. Couto illustrates, a court may restrain online communications that amount to coercive control or other domestic violence, but the restriction must be narrowly tailored to that harmful conduct rather than a blanket ban on all speech. A court can also order removal of content that constitutes domestic violence.

Does abuse against one family member affect a case for another?

It can. Washington courts have recognized that domestic violence directed at one household member — such as a parent — can constitute domestic violence against another household member, including children. Courts consider how a pattern of conduct affects the household as a whole.

Talk to a Seattle-Area Protection Order Attorney

Protection order cases are fact-intensive, and coercive control claims in particular depend on presenting a clear, well-documented pattern of behavior. Whether you are seeking protection or responding to a petition, experienced counsel can help you present a clear, well-documented case.

The attorneys at Blair & Kim represent clients in civil protection order and family law matters throughout King, Pierce, and Snohomish Counties, with offices in Seattle and Bellevue. The firm’s combined criminal defense and family law experience is particularly valuable in cases where domestic violence, divorce, and custody issues overlap.

Discuss your situation with Blair & Kim. To talk with our team about a protection order or related family law matter, call (206) 622-6562 or contact us here. You can also review answers to common questions on our FAQ page

Pleading guilty is one of the most consequential decisions a person can make in a criminal case. But what happens if you change your mind before sentencing? In State v. Korsakas, decided May 21, 2026, the Washington Supreme Court addressed a critical question about your right to counsel when withdrawing a guilty plea — and the answer is more nuanced than many defendants expect. The decision matters for anyone facing serious charges in King, Pierce, or Snohomish County who is weighing whether to accept a plea deal.

What is a Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea?

(1) A motion to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing is a critical stage where you have a right to counsel.

(2) Washington courts allow withdrawal only to correct a “manifest injustice” under CrR 4.2(f).

(3) In State v. Korsakas (2026), the Supreme Court held a defendant was not “completely” denied counsel even though his lawyer declined to argue the motion.

 

The criminal defense attorneys at Blair & Kim follow Washington appellate decisions closely so our clients understand how shifting case law affects their rights. Below, we break down what the court decided, what it left open, and why the ruling deserves attention from anyone navigating a plea in Washington.

What Happened in State v. Korsakas

Kristopher Korsakas was charged with multiple violations of domestic violence protection orders, domestic violence stalking, first-degree criminal impersonation, and misdemeanor stalking. Near the end of the State’s case at trial, he chose to plead guilty to all counts. The trial judge conducted a thorough colloquy and found the plea knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

At his sentencing hearing roughly six weeks later, Korsakas asked to withdraw that plea, claiming his trial attorney had been ineffective. His lawyer, however, declined to argue the motion, telling the judge it was a “collateral attack” he didn’t normally get involved with. The judge let Korsakas argue the motion himself, found no “manifest injustice,” and denied it. Korsakas was ultimately sentenced to 162 months in prison.

On appeal, Korsakas argued he had been completely denied counsel at a critical stage — an error so serious it would require automatic reversal. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that because his attorney remained appointed, available, and free of any conflict of interest, Korsakas was not completely denied counsel. The court affirmed the conviction.

A Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea Is a “Critical Stage”

One important point the court confirmed: a motion to withdraw a guilty plea made before judgment is entered is a critical stage of a criminal prosecution. Both the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution guarantee the right to a lawyer’s assistance at critical stages of a criminal prosecution. The defense attorney in this case was simply wrong to treat the motion as a “collateral attack” — under CrR 4.2(f), a presentence motion to withdraw is not a collateral attack at all.

So why did the court still affirm? Because the legal standard for “complete denial of counsel” is narrow. Under United States v. Cronic, that kind of automatic-reversal error happens only when a lawyer is totally absent, silenced, or otherwise prevented from helping during a critical stage. Korsakas’s attorney was none of those things — he remained in the courtroom and handled the rest of the sentencing.

Considering a plea — or having second thoughts about one? The decision to plead guilty has lasting consequences. Before you decide, talk through your options with Blair & Kim’s criminal defense team.

When Does “Manifest Injustice” Let You Withdraw a Plea?

Washington law does not give defendants an absolute right to take back a guilty plea once a judge has accepted it. Instead, CrR 4.2(f) requires a court to allow withdrawal only when it is necessary to correct a manifest injustice — defined by Washington courts as an injustice that is “obvious, directly observable, overt, not obscure.” The court has long recognized four non-exclusive examples:

  • The plea was involuntary;
  • The defendant did not ratify the plea;
  • The defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the plea; or
  • The prosecution failed to honor a plea agreement.

Because a signed plea statement and a careful plea colloquy create a strong — “well nigh irrefutable” — presumption that a plea was voluntary, a defendant who wants to withdraw must point to specific facts strong enough to overcome that presumption. General dissatisfaction is not enough.

The Dissent: Two Justices Would Have Reversed

The decision was not unanimous. In a forceful dissent, Justice Whitener — joined by Justice Gordon McCloud — argued that Korsakas was denied counsel. The dissent emphasized that the trial judge effectively required Korsakas to argue a complex legal motion alone, without warning him that he had a right to a lawyer’s help at that stage and without confirming he wished to give up that right.

In the dissent’s view, physical presence in the courtroom is not the same as the assistance of counsel. The justices would have reversed and sent the case back for a proper hearing. While dissents don’t change the outcome, they often signal arguments that future defendants — and future courts — may revisit.

Notably, the majority did not foreclose a separate claim that the lawyer’s mishandling of the motion was ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington — a path a defendant in this situation may still pursue. Because Korsakas did not raise that argument, the court did not decide it, leaving the door open for similar challenges to be framed as ineffective-assistance claims rather than complete-denial-of-counsel claims.

Why This Matters if You’re Facing Domestic Violence or Protection Order Charges

Korsakas was charged with violating domestic violence protection orders and DV stalking — exactly the kind of high-stakes case where the pressure to resolve quickly can be intense. These cases can carry aggravating factors that increase a sentence, as one did here. That makes the decision to plead guilty, and any later effort to undo it, especially significant.

The practical lesson from Korsakas is that the time to get sound advice is before you enter a plea — not after. Once a Washington court accepts a guilty plea, undoing it is difficult. Defendants facing overlapping criminal charges and domestic violence issues benefit from a defense team that understands how a plea in one matter can ripple across related family law and protection order proceedings. Blair & Kim handles both, drawing on decades of combined experience in courts throughout the Seattle metro area, including Bellevue and the surrounding Eastside.

Frequently Asked Questions

Can I withdraw a guilty plea in Washington after I’ve entered it?

Sometimes. Before judgment is entered, a court must allow withdrawal under CrR 4.2(f) only if it is necessary to correct a “manifest injustice” — for example, an involuntary plea or ineffective assistance of counsel. You must present specific facts, because a properly entered plea carries a strong presumption that it was voluntary.

Do I have a right to a lawyer when I move to withdraw my plea?

Yes. A presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a “critical stage” of the case, so your constitutional right to counsel applies. As Korsakas shows, however, courts apply a narrow test for whether a defendant was “completely” denied counsel, which is why having an engaged attorney from the start is so important.

What is “manifest injustice”?

Washington courts define manifest injustice as an injustice that is obvious, directly observable, overt, and not obscure. It is a demanding standard, which is why withdrawing a plea is far harder than entering one.

Talk With a Washington Criminal Defense Attorney

If you are facing criminal charges anywhere in King, Pierce, or Snohomish County — or you have questions about your right to counsel when withdrawing a guilty plea — get experienced guidance before making decisions that can follow you for years. The attorneys at Blair & Kim bring former prosecutor experience and a track record across more than 15,000 matters to every case they handle. Contact Blair & Kim today. Call (206) 622-6562 or reach our team online to discuss your situation with a Washington criminal defense attorney.

A new decision from the Washington Supreme Court has changed how the charge of interfering with reporting domestic violence under RCW 9A.36.150 is analyzed in court. In State v. Buck, decided May 14, 2026, the Court held that this offense is a single crime — not three separate “alternative means” of committing a crime. If you are facing a domestic violence-related charge in King, Pierce, or Snohomish County, the criminal defense attorneys at Blair & Kim can explain how this ruling may affect the arguments available in your case.

The distinction sounds technical, but it touches a constitutional right that matters in every criminal trial: the right to a unanimous jury.

The Charge: Interfering With Reporting Domestic Violence

When a Washington court enters a domestic violence protection order, the order itself eventually expires. But the court’s finding that domestic violence occurred can outlast the order by years. A recent decision from the Washington Court of Appeals confirms that a person subject to an expired DVPO can still appeal it—because the underlying finding can damage a reputation, a professional license, and a livelihood long after the order is gone. If you are facing or responding to a protection order, the civil protection orders attorneys at Blair & Kim, PLLC help clients in Seattle, Bellevue, and across King, Pierce, and Snohomish Counties understand exactly what is at stake.

Quick answer: In Washington, you can appeal a DVPO even after it expires, because a domestic violence finding can carry consequences—like professional-licensing review—that may outlast the order itself.

 

In In re the DVPO for Rejoice Neal, No. 40361-1-III (Wash. Ct. App. May 21, 2026) (unpublished), Division Three addressed three issues that matter to anyone involved in a protection order case: whether an expired order can still be appealed, how courts treat a petitioner’s recantation, and how detailed a trial judge’s findings must be.

What Happened in the Case

The case arose from a relationship between two health care workers. After the relationship ended, both parties filed competing DVPO petitions. A court commissioner initially denied both petitions, finding neither party had proved domestic violence by a preponderance of the evidence. One party moved to revise that ruling, and on revision the trial court granted a one-year DVPO, finding that the petitioner had been subjected to both the infliction of fear of physical harm and coercive control.

By the time the appeal reached Division Three, the one-year order had already expired. The respondent—who operates an in-home care facility for vulnerable adults—argued the appeal should still proceed because a domestic violence finding directly threatened his professional standing. The court agreed and reached the merits, ultimately affirming the order.

Protection order cases move quickly and the stakes are high for both sides. If you have a hearing approaching anywhere in the Seattle metro—including Bellevue, Kirkland, or Redmond—Blair & Kim’s family law team can help you prepare. Call (206) 622-6562 to discuss your situation.

Can you appeal a domestic violence protection order in Washington after it expires?

Yes—an expired DVPO can still be appealed in Washington. Although courts normally dismiss an appeal once they can no longer provide effective relief—a doctrine called mootness—Division Three held that this appeal was not moot. The court explained that “effective relief” can include clearing a person’s record and reputation of the continuing stigma that a protection order leaves behind.

That stigma is not abstract. The court noted that a domestic violence finding can be reviewed when the state decides whether to grant or deny licenses to operate adult family homes and nursing homes. Because a wrongful finding could damage this respondent’s ability to earn a living in the care industry, the appeal was not moot. The practical takeaway: in Washington, a DVPO finding may carry collateral consequences that can survive the order itself, depending on the circumstances—so appealing an expired order may still be worthwhile in some cases.

Does recanting a domestic violence report defeat a DVPO petition in Washington?

Not automatically. A central dispute in this case involved a recantation: after an initial report to police, the petitioner asked that the matter be dropped, and the respondent argued the trial court wrongly refused to weigh that recantation against the petitioner’s credibility.

Division Three clarified two related points. First, under RCW 7.105.225(2), a court may not deny a protection order simply because the petitioner did not report the conduct to law enforcement. Second, even so, a recantation may be considered as an inconsistent statement bearing on credibility—a court is allowed to weigh it. The trial court here did exactly that. It acknowledged the recantation but gave it limited weight, observing that recantation by people who have experienced domestic violence is common and does not necessarily mean the original report was false. The appeals court found no abuse of discretion in that approach.

How detailed do a judge’s findings have to be to grant a DVPO?

A judge’s findings do not have to be lengthy or in writing. Division Three declined to require trial courts to issue detailed written findings or extended oral rulings every time they enter a protection order. The court recognized a practical reality: judges often hear many protection order matters in a single morning, and parties frequently appear without lawyers.

What the law does require is a reasoned decision that allows a reviewing court to understand the basis for the order. Here, the trial court’s oral ruling explained that it found the respondent not credible on two specific points and that it accepted the petitioner’s account of being threatened with a weapon and subjected to coercive control. That was enough. The court affirmed the DVPO based on both the infliction of fear of physical harm and coercive control, the latter defined under RCW 7.105.010 as a pattern of behavior that unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and personal liberty.

What This Means for Petitioners and Respondents

For petitioners, the decision reinforces that a protection order can be supported by documentary evidence and a credible declaration, that a prior recantation will not automatically sink a case, and that coercive control is a recognized, independent basis for a DVPO in Washington. For respondents, it is a reminder that a protection order is not just a temporary inconvenience—the finding behind it can affect professional licensing and reputation for years, which is why a wrongly entered order may be worth challenging even after it expires.

Domestic violence protection orders sit at the intersection of family law and criminal defense, and the same set of facts can trigger consequences in more than one arena. Having attorneys who handle both can make a meaningful difference in how a protection order matter is approached.

Talk to Blair & Kim About Your Protection Order

Whether you are seeking a DVPO, responding to one, or considering an appeal of an expired protection order in Washington, the attorneys at Blair & Kim, PLLC can help you understand your options and prepare for the hearing that matters most. The firm serves clients throughout King, Pierce, and Snohomish Counties from offices in Seattle and Bellevue. Call (206) 622-6562 or contact us online to discuss your case.

When does a neighbor dispute cross the line into unlawful harassment—and what can a court do about it? In Perkins v. Jensen, No. 88080-2-I (Wash. Ct. App. April 27, 2026), the Washington Court of Appeals, Division One, affirmed an anti-harassment protection order against a construction company co-owner whose employees engaged in a pattern of deliberate harassment against a neighboring homeowner in Snohomish County. The decision addresses several important questions about how anti-harassment protection orders work under Washington’s protection order statute, chapter 7.105 RCW.

If you are dealing with harassment from a neighbor, a business, or any other person, the attorneys at Blair & Kim can help you understand your legal options. Contact us for a confidential case evaluation.

What Happened in Perkins v. Jensen?

Changing a parenting plan in Washington is never easy. The law deliberately makes modifications difficult to protect children from the instability of constant schedule changes. But when a parent’s work schedule changes and they want a modest adjustment to their residential time, the law also provides a pathway: the minor modification under RCW 26.09.260(5). In In re Marriage of McCormick, No. 41124-9-III (Wash. Ct. App. April 9, 2026), the Washington Court of Appeals reversed a trial court’s denial of a father’s petition for a minor modification because the court failed to properly calculate whether the requested change fell within the statute’s 24-day limit. If you are seeking to modify a parenting plan in Washington, this decision illustrates both the process and the pitfalls.

Whether you need to modify an existing parenting plan or respond to a modification petition, the family law team at Blair & Kim can help. Contact us for a confidential case evaluation.

What Is a Minor Modification Under Washington Law?

When a person faces multiple sex crime charges involving different complainants, one of the most important defense decisions is whether to move for separate trials. In State v. Krause, No. 103835-6 (Wash. Mar. 26, 2026), the Washington Supreme Court issued a 7-2 published decision that significantly raises the bar for defendants seeking to sever multiple rape charges. The ruling reverses a Court of Appeals decision that had granted severance and has immediate implications for how sex offense cases are tried throughout Washington, including in Snohomish County, where this case originated.

If you or someone you know is facing sex crime charges in Washington, the criminal defense team at Blair & Kim can help you understand your rights and build an effective defense strategy. Contact us for a confidential case evaluation.

What Happened in State v. Krause?

Washington law provides several types of civil protection orders designed to protect people from violence, harassment, stalking, and abuse. Since July 1, 2022, all of these orders are governed by a single statute—chapter 7.105 RCW—which consolidated what had previously been scattered across multiple chapters of the Revised Code of Washington. Whether you are considering seeking a protection order or have been served with one, understanding the different types and how they work is an important first step.

The attorneys at Blair & Kim handle protection order cases for both petitioners and respondents throughout King, Pierce, and Snohomish Counties. Contact us for a confidential case evaluation.

The Six Types of Protection Orders in Washington

When someone faces domestic violence charges in Washington, every element of every count matters. In State v. Kane, No. 86684-2-I (Wash. Ct. App. March 30, 2026), the Washington Court of Appeals, Division One, reversed a conviction for interfering with domestic violence reporting because the State failed to prove the identity of the person whose 911 call was allegedly prevented. The ruling is a reminder that prosecutors bear the burden of proving every element of a DV-related offense beyond a reasonable doubt—and courts will hold them to it.

If you are facing DV charges in Seattle, Bellevue, or anywhere in the greater Puget Sound area, the attorneys at Blair Kim Moeller, PLLC can help you understand your options and mount an effective defense. Contact us for a confidential case evaluation.

What Happened in State v. Kane?

When someone is charged with felony harassment in Washington, the prosecution must prove that the accused knowingly made a threat to kill. But what mental state must the State prove regarding whether the defendant understood the threatening nature of those words? In a significant en banc decision filed on March 19, 2026, the Washington Supreme Court addressed this exact question in State v. Calloway, No. 103374-5, and the ruling has direct implications for anyone facing harassment charges in Seattle, Bellevue, and throughout King, Pierce, and Snohomish Counties.

If you or someone you know is facing harassment charges in Washington, the attorneys at Blair Kim Moeller, PLLC can help you understand how this new ruling may affect your case. Contact us for a confidential case evaluation.

What Did the Court Decide in State v. Calloway?

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