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When someone faces domestic violence charges in Washington, every element of every count matters. In State v. Kane, No. 86684-2-I (Wash. Ct. App. March 30, 2026), the Washington Court of Appeals, Division One, reversed a conviction for interfering with domestic violence reporting because the State failed to prove the identity of the person whose 911 call was allegedly prevented. The ruling is a reminder that prosecutors bear the burden of proving every element of a DV-related offense beyond a reasonable doubt—and courts will hold them to it.

If you are facing DV charges in Seattle, Bellevue, or anywhere in the greater Puget Sound area, the attorneys at Blair & Kim can help you understand your options and mount an effective defense. Contact us for a confidential case evaluation.

What Happened in State v. Kane?

When someone is charged with felony harassment in Washington, the prosecution must prove that the accused knowingly made a threat to kill. But what mental state must the State prove regarding whether the defendant understood the threatening nature of those words? In a significant en banc decision filed on March 19, 2026, the Washington Supreme Court addressed this exact question in State v. Calloway, No. 103374-5, and the ruling has direct implications for anyone facing harassment charges in Seattle, Bellevue, and throughout King, Pierce, and Snohomish Counties.

If you or someone you know is facing harassment charges in Washington, the attorneys at Blair & Kim can help you understand how this new ruling may affect your case. Contact us for a confidential case evaluation.

What Did the Court Decide in State v. Calloway?

Domestic violence protection orders can reshape every aspect of a family’s life—restricting contact with a spouse, limiting time with children, and creating a record that follows the respondent for years. In In re Marriage of Sheridan, No. 87948-1-I (Wash. Ct. App. March 16, 2026), the Washington Court of Appeals, Division One, affirmed a DVPO and clarified two important points about how these orders work under Washington’s protection order statute, chapter 7.105 RCW. For anyone involved in a civil protection order proceeding in the Seattle area, this decision matters.

Whether you are seeking a protection order or defending against one, the attorneys at Blair & Kim can help you navigate the process. Contact us for a confidential case evaluation.

What Happened in Sheridan?

Dividing a business in a Washington divorce is one of the most contentious issues a couple can face—especially when the business’s primary asset is uncollected accounts receivable. In In re Marriage of Ellison, No. 87236-2-I (Wash. Ct. App. March 9, 2026), the Washington Court of Appeals, Division One, upheld a King County trial court’s decision to value a solo law practice’s accounts receivable at their full gross amount of $472,000 after the business owner failed to provide credible evidence justifying a lower figure. The case offers critical lessons for anyone going through a divorce that involves a business, professional practice, or significant financial accounts.

If you are facing a divorce involving business assets, property division, or complex financial issues, the family law team at Blair & Kim can help. Contact us for a confidential case evaluation.

The Dispute: How Much Are Uncollected Fees Really Worth?

When a divorce is finalized in Washington, the dissolution decree assigns specific debts and obligations to each spouse. But life does not stop at the decree. Cars break down, financial circumstances shift, and ex-spouses sometimes make informal arrangements to address new realities. The problem is that these side agreements can fundamentally change who owes what—and if something unexpected happens, the spouse who relied on an informal deal may end up with nothing to enforce. A recent Washington Court of Appeals decision, In re Marriage of Hoffner, No. 60680-1-II (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2026), illustrates exactly how this plays out. If you are going through a divorce or dealing with enforcement of a decree in the Seattle area, the family law attorneys at Blair & Kim can help you protect your rights at every stage.

What Happened in the Hoffner Case?

The Hoffners’ divorce decree, based on a CR 2A agreement, required the husband to pay off a specific bank account debt—an Alaska account with a balance of approximately $57,600—that was connected to the wife’s car. The decree contemplated that proceeds from the sale of the marital home would cover this debt, but the home sold for less than expected, leaving about $27,000 still owed on the account. The husband agreed to pay the remaining balance in installments.

Then the wife’s car developed mechanical problems. The parties made a side agreement: the wife would trade in her car, the husband would cosign on a replacement vehicle, and the husband would make monthly payments on the new car’s loan until he had paid off the approximately $19,000 still owed from the original decree obligation. The husband also paid the insurance on the replacement car.

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When police tell you that you’re “not under arrest” before questioning you, that statement does not automatically mean you’re free to leave. In State v. Magana-Arevalo, No. 103586-1 (Wash. Jan. 15, 2026), the Washington Supreme Court held that whether a suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes depends on the totality of the circumstances—not on a single officer’s claim that the suspect is free to go. The court also clarified the test for constitutional harmless error and reaffirmed that a suspect’s race and ethnicity are relevant factors in the custody analysis. If you are facing criminal charges in the Seattle area, this decision may affect whether statements you made to police can be used against you.

What Happened in State v. Magana-Arevalo?

On December 1, 2018, at approximately 6:00 a.m., Renton police and a SWAT team arrived at Cristian Magaña Arévalo’s partner’s apartment. Officers used a bullhorn to order everyone out, separated Magaña Arévalo from his partner and young child, zip-tied his wrists behind his back, placed him in a patrol car, and drove him to a staging area in a grocery store parking lot surrounded by law enforcement vehicles and officers.

Once there, a detective removed the zip ties and told Magaña Arévalo he was “not under arrest and was free to leave at any time.” The detective then questioned him in the back of an unmarked work truck while another armed detective sat in the front seat. No Miranda warnings were given. Two days later, on December 3, a detective went to his home for a follow-up interview—again without Miranda warnings. The trial court admitted all of these statements into evidence.

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The Washington Supreme Court has held that courts may consider race and ethnicity as relevant, objective factors when determining whether a person was in custody for Miranda purposes. In State v. Wasuge, No. 103530-6 (Wash. Jan. 15, 2026), the court’s unanimous en banc opinion also addressed the admissibility of expert testimony on blood alcohol concentration thresholds in “affected by” DUI cases. If you are facing DUI charges in the Seattle area, this ruling has significant implications for how your defense attorney can challenge the circumstances of your stop and arrest.

What Did the Court Decide in Wasuge?

The court addressed two issues. First, it held that even if a toxicology expert’s testimony about the American Medical Association’s recommended 0.05 percent BAC threshold was improperly admitted in an “affected by” DUI prosecution, the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of impairment. Second — and more broadly significant — the court held that race and ethnicity are relevant factors that courts may objectively consider under the “totality of the circumstances” test when analyzing whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes.

A Washington appeals court has confirmed that trial courts cannot order joint decision-making in a parenting plan when both parents have a history of domestic violence. In In re Marriage of Thiess, No. 87345-8-I (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2026), Division One held that former RCW 26.09.191(1) prohibits mutual decision-making whenever at least one parent has a founded history of domestic violence — even when both parents have such findings. If you are going through a divorce or custody dispute in King County that involves domestic violence allegations, this ruling could directly affect how your parenting plan is structured.

What Did the Court Decide in Thiess?

The Court of Appeals reversed a trial court’s order requiring joint decision-making between two parents who had both been found to have committed domestic violence. The mother had a history of physical domestic violence, and the father had a history of emotional domestic violence as defined under RCW 7.105.010. Despite those findings, the trial court ordered joint decision-making, reasoning that restricting both parents did not make “common sense.”

Division One disagreed. The court held that former RCW 26.09.191(1) uses mandatory language — “shall not require mutual decision-making” — and that the statute applies when any parent has a history of domestic violence. The court remanded the case and ordered the trial court to assign sole decision-making authority to one parent.

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Sometimes when a student has suffered severe disciplinary action following an unfair Title IX investigation and disciplinary proceeding, they may pursue their own Title IX claim against the school.  A federal court in Arizona recently considered a motion to dismiss a male student’s Title IX, § 1983, and state law claims after he was suspended for sexual misconduct.

The plaintiff, “John Doe,” and “Jane Roe” each filed student conduct complaints against each other following a sexual encounter on an Arizona university campus.  Jane filed a Title IX complaint against John and he was found responsible for sexual misconduct.  He sued the university against the university’s Board of Regents and several individual defendants alleging violation of Title IX, violations of 42 U.S.C.  § 1983 and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

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In most cases, a person protected by a Washington civil protect order wants the order and limitations it provides.  A vulnerable adult protection order, however, is commonly sought by someone else on behalf of the vulnerable person, and in some cases, the allegedly vulnerable person may object to the order.  In a recent unpublished case, a man recently challenged a vulnerable adult protection order issued against him.

The petitioner sought a vulnerable adult protection order  as attorney for a woman who was over 80 years old and had dementia and other health issues.  She alleged the respondent had “abandoned, abused, financially exploited, or neglected” the woman, identifying specific incidents.  The petition alleged the respondent had taken the woman from her retirement community to her former home twice, which upset her when she learned the place had been rented.  The petitioner also alleged the respondent had given the woman alcohol twice when he was aware she had issues with alcohol abuse.  The petitioner provided declarations from herself, the woman’s brother, another of the woman’s relatives, and an agent with a durable power of attorney.

The respondent submitted his own declaration, transcripts of calls with the woman, and two character reference letters.

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