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Police Said You’re “Not Under Arrest”—But Were You Actually in Custody?

When police tell you that you’re “not under arrest” before questioning you, that statement does not automatically mean you’re free to leave. In State v. Magana-Arevalo, No. 103586-1 (Wash. Jan. 15, 2026), the Washington Supreme Court held that whether a suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes depends on the totality of the circumstances—not on a single officer’s claim that the suspect is free to go. The court also clarified the test for constitutional harmless error and reaffirmed that a suspect’s race and ethnicity are relevant factors in the custody analysis. If you are facing criminal charges in the Seattle area, this decision may affect whether statements you made to police can be used against you.

What Happened in State v. Magana-Arevalo?

On December 1, 2018, at approximately 6:00 a.m., Renton police and a SWAT team arrived at Cristian Magaña Arévalo’s partner’s apartment. Officers used a bullhorn to order everyone out, separated Magaña Arévalo from his partner and young child, zip-tied his wrists behind his back, placed him in a patrol car, and drove him to a staging area in a grocery store parking lot surrounded by law enforcement vehicles and officers.

Once there, a detective removed the zip ties and told Magaña Arévalo he was “not under arrest and was free to leave at any time.” The detective then questioned him in the back of an unmarked work truck while another armed detective sat in the front seat. No Miranda warnings were given. Two days later, on December 3, a detective went to his home for a follow-up interview—again without Miranda warnings. The trial court admitted all of these statements into evidence.

Magaña Arévalo was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to 320 months in prison plus a consecutive 60-month firearm enhancement.

What Did the Supreme Court Decide?

The Supreme Court’s en banc opinion addressed three major issues, each with practical consequences for criminal defendants in Washington.

“Not under arrest” does not mean you’re not in custody. The court held that an officer’s statement that a suspect is “free to leave” is just one factor in the totality of the circumstances analysis—it does not override other indicators of custody. Here, the totality included a SWAT team deployment at 6:00 a.m., physical restraint with zip ties, separation from family, transport to a police-controlled staging area, isolation for approximately 40–45 minutes, confrontation with incriminating evidence, and interrogation by two armed detectives in a vehicle. Under those circumstances, a reasonable person would not have felt free to end the encounter and leave, regardless of what the detective said.

Race and ethnicity matter in the custody analysis. Consistent with its companion decision in State v. Wasuge, No. 103530-6 (Wash. Jan. 15, 2026), the court held that a suspect’s race and ethnicity are relevant, objective factors in the Miranda custody determination. The court cited Washington-specific data showing that Latinos are killed by police at 1.3 times the rate of non-Hispanic white people and face higher rates of stops, use of force, and incarceration. Following State v. Sum, 199 Wn.2d 627 (2022), the court recognized that communities of color are “generally well aware of such patterns of excessive police scrutiny” and that this awareness makes encounters with law enforcement feel “more pointed and coercive.” Magaña Arévalo’s Latino ethnicity was one more factor supporting the finding of custody.

The harmless error test requires courts to weigh both sides. The court clarified Washington’s test for constitutional harmless error, resolving confusion in prior case law between the “overwhelming untainted evidence” test and the “contribution” test. Under the clarified standard, reviewing courts must consider both (1) the prejudicial or corrosive impact of the erroneously admitted evidence, including how it may have affected the jury’s view of even the properly admitted evidence, and (2) the strength of the properly admitted evidence of guilt. The State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

How Does This Affect Motions to Suppress in Washington?

Magana-Arevalo helps suppression motions in several ways. First, it makes clear that officers cannot immunize an interrogation from Miranda by simply telling a suspect they are “free to leave.” Defense attorneys can now point to this opinion when arguing that the surrounding circumstances—physical restraint, police-controlled location, separation from family, confrontation with evidence—are more significant than a verbal disclaimer.

Second, the opinion provides a detailed, factor-by-factor roadmap for building a custody argument: (a) whether the interrogation occurred in a police-controlled location, (b) whether the suspect was isolated from family, (c) whether officers woke the suspect, restrained them, or restricted movement, (d) whether officers confronted the suspect with incriminating evidence, (e) the suspect’s race and ethnicity, and (f) the totality of all circumstances weighed together. The criminal defense attorneys at Blair & Kim understand how to present this evidence effectively in King County, Pierce County, and Snohomish County courts.

Does an Earlier Miranda Violation Taint Later Statements?

Not necessarily under current federal law, but the answer may be different under Washington’s state constitution in the future. In Magana-Arevalo, the court held that the defendant’s December 1 statements were obtained through unconstitutional custodial interrogation. But it also held that the December 3 statements—made voluntarily and without custody two days later at the defendant’s home—were not tainted by the earlier violation under federal constitutional law, following the general rule from Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).

However, two concurrences signaled that this issue is not settled under Washington’s state constitution. Justice Yu’s concurrence (joined by Justices Whitener and Mangia) argued that article I, section 9 of the Washington Constitution should provide stronger protection than the Fifth Amendment and called for future litigants to brief the issue of an independent state exclusionary rule. Justice González’s concurrence in part and dissent in part (joined by Justice Montoya-Lewis) went further, arguing that the December 3 statement should have been suppressed under the state constitution because the follow-up interview was “in every meaningful way simply a continuation of the first.”

For defense practitioners, this means that in cases where police obtain an initial statement through a Miranda violation and then return for a follow-up interview, raising a state constitutional challenge under article I, section 9 is now a viable strategy—and one that at least five justices appear receptive to in the right case. Defense attorneys should specifically brief the state constitutional issue at the trial court level to preserve it for appellate review. Justice Yu’s concurrence expressly invited future litigants to do so, and Justice González’s opinion provided a framework for arguing that a follow-up interview exploiting an earlier violation constitutes compelled self-incrimination under Washington’s constitution.

What Is the Clarified Harmless Error Test?

When a trial court admits evidence in violation of the constitution, the conviction can stand only if the State proves the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Before Magana-Arevalo, Washington courts sometimes described this test in conflicting ways—some opinions focused only on whether the untainted evidence was “overwhelming,” while others asked whether the error “contributed” to the verdict. The Supreme Court clarified that the correct test considers both prongs together: the reviewing court must weigh the strength of the properly admitted evidence alongside the corrosive impact of the improperly admitted evidence.

This matters for defense attorneys because it prevents appellate courts from simply pointing to strong evidence of guilt and ignoring how prejudicial the improperly admitted evidence was. Mark Blair, a former prosecutor who has handled over 15,000 criminal cases in Washington courts and serves as a Judge Pro Tem at Lakewood Municipal Court, understands how harmless error analysis plays out on appeal and structures trial-level objections to preserve these issues for review.

Talk to an Experienced Seattle Criminal Defense Attorney

Magana-Arevalo reinforces that what officers say during an encounter matters far less than what they do. If you were physically restrained, separated from family, transported to a police location, or subjected to interrogation under coercive circumstances—even if officers told you that you were free to leave—your statements may have been obtained in violation of Miranda. Blair & Kim’s criminal defense team brings a former prosecutor’s insight to every case across King County, Pierce County, and Snohomish County courts.

To discuss your criminal case with an experienced Seattle defense attorney, call Blair & Kim at (206) 622-6562 or contact the firm online.

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