Articles Posted in Criminal Law

A recent decision from the Washington Court of Appeals shows how much can turn on the objections a defense makes during trial. State v. Gulliksen, an unpublished opinion filed June 30, 2026, involved a restaurant supervisor convicted of second degree identity theft over charges on two employer credit cards. On appeal she argued that the trial court violated her Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. The court never reached the merits of that argument, because she had not raised it at her retrial. Blair & Kim’s criminal defense team follows rulings like this one, since they shape how financial-crime cases get tried in King, Pierce, and Snohomish County courtrooms.

Case Summary: In Washington, a defendant who does not object at trial on confrontation clause grounds usually cannot raise that objection for the first time on appeal. A general “foundation” objection does not preserve the issue. In State v. Gulliksen, Division II of the Court of Appeals applied that rule and affirmed a second degree identity theft conviction.

The credit card charges behind the case

Pleading guilty is one of the most consequential decisions a person can make in a criminal case. But what happens if you change your mind before sentencing? In State v. Korsakas, decided May 21, 2026, the Washington Supreme Court addressed a critical question about your right to counsel when withdrawing a guilty plea — and the answer is more nuanced than many defendants expect. The decision matters for anyone facing serious charges in King, Pierce, or Snohomish County who is weighing whether to accept a plea deal.

What is a Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea?

(1) A motion to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing is a critical stage where you have a right to counsel.

(2) Washington courts allow withdrawal only to correct a “manifest injustice” under CrR 4.2(f).

(3) In State v. Korsakas (2026), the Supreme Court held a defendant was not “completely” denied counsel even though his lawyer declined to argue the motion.

 

The criminal defense attorneys at Blair & Kim follow Washington appellate decisions closely so our clients understand how shifting case law affects their rights. Below, we break down what the court decided, what it left open, and why the ruling deserves attention from anyone navigating a plea in Washington.

What Happened in State v. Korsakas

Kristopher Korsakas was charged with multiple violations of domestic violence protection orders, domestic violence stalking, first-degree criminal impersonation, and misdemeanor stalking. Near the end of the State’s case at trial, he chose to plead guilty to all counts. The trial judge conducted a thorough colloquy and found the plea knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

At his sentencing hearing roughly six weeks later, Korsakas asked to withdraw that plea, claiming his trial attorney had been ineffective. His lawyer, however, declined to argue the motion, telling the judge it was a “collateral attack” he didn’t normally get involved with. The judge let Korsakas argue the motion himself, found no “manifest injustice,” and denied it. Korsakas was ultimately sentenced to 162 months in prison.

On appeal, Korsakas argued he had been completely denied counsel at a critical stage — an error so serious it would require automatic reversal. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that because his attorney remained appointed, available, and free of any conflict of interest, Korsakas was not completely denied counsel. The court affirmed the conviction.

A Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea Is a “Critical Stage”

One important point the court confirmed: a motion to withdraw a guilty plea made before judgment is entered is a critical stage of a criminal prosecution. Both the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution guarantee the right to a lawyer’s assistance at critical stages of a criminal prosecution. The defense attorney in this case was simply wrong to treat the motion as a “collateral attack” — under CrR 4.2(f), a presentence motion to withdraw is not a collateral attack at all.

So why did the court still affirm? Because the legal standard for “complete denial of counsel” is narrow. Under United States v. Cronic, that kind of automatic-reversal error happens only when a lawyer is totally absent, silenced, or otherwise prevented from helping during a critical stage. Korsakas’s attorney was none of those things — he remained in the courtroom and handled the rest of the sentencing.

Considering a plea — or having second thoughts about one? The decision to plead guilty has lasting consequences. Before you decide, talk through your options with Blair & Kim’s criminal defense team.

When Does “Manifest Injustice” Let You Withdraw a Plea?

Washington law does not give defendants an absolute right to take back a guilty plea once a judge has accepted it. Instead, CrR 4.2(f) requires a court to allow withdrawal only when it is necessary to correct a manifest injustice — defined by Washington courts as an injustice that is “obvious, directly observable, overt, not obscure.” The court has long recognized four non-exclusive examples:

  • The plea was involuntary;
  • The defendant did not ratify the plea;
  • The defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the plea; or
  • The prosecution failed to honor a plea agreement.

Because a signed plea statement and a careful plea colloquy create a strong — “well nigh irrefutable” — presumption that a plea was voluntary, a defendant who wants to withdraw must point to specific facts strong enough to overcome that presumption. General dissatisfaction is not enough.

The Dissent: Two Justices Would Have Reversed

The decision was not unanimous. In a forceful dissent, Justice Whitener — joined by Justice Gordon McCloud — argued that Korsakas was denied counsel. The dissent emphasized that the trial judge effectively required Korsakas to argue a complex legal motion alone, without warning him that he had a right to a lawyer’s help at that stage and without confirming he wished to give up that right.

In the dissent’s view, physical presence in the courtroom is not the same as the assistance of counsel. The justices would have reversed and sent the case back for a proper hearing. While dissents don’t change the outcome, they often signal arguments that future defendants — and future courts — may revisit.

Notably, the majority did not foreclose a separate claim that the lawyer’s mishandling of the motion was ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington — a path a defendant in this situation may still pursue. Because Korsakas did not raise that argument, the court did not decide it, leaving the door open for similar challenges to be framed as ineffective-assistance claims rather than complete-denial-of-counsel claims.

Why This Matters if You’re Facing Domestic Violence or Protection Order Charges

Korsakas was charged with violating domestic violence protection orders and DV stalking — exactly the kind of high-stakes case where the pressure to resolve quickly can be intense. These cases can carry aggravating factors that increase a sentence, as one did here. That makes the decision to plead guilty, and any later effort to undo it, especially significant.

The practical lesson from Korsakas is that the time to get sound advice is before you enter a plea — not after. Once a Washington court accepts a guilty plea, undoing it is difficult. Defendants facing overlapping criminal charges and domestic violence issues benefit from a defense team that understands how a plea in one matter can ripple across related family law and protection order proceedings. Blair & Kim handles both, drawing on decades of combined experience in courts throughout the Seattle metro area, including Bellevue and the surrounding Eastside.

Frequently Asked Questions

Can I withdraw a guilty plea in Washington after I’ve entered it?

Sometimes. Before judgment is entered, a court must allow withdrawal under CrR 4.2(f) only if it is necessary to correct a “manifest injustice” — for example, an involuntary plea or ineffective assistance of counsel. You must present specific facts, because a properly entered plea carries a strong presumption that it was voluntary.

Do I have a right to a lawyer when I move to withdraw my plea?

Yes. A presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a “critical stage” of the case, so your constitutional right to counsel applies. As Korsakas shows, however, courts apply a narrow test for whether a defendant was “completely” denied counsel, which is why having an engaged attorney from the start is so important.

What is “manifest injustice”?

Washington courts define manifest injustice as an injustice that is obvious, directly observable, overt, and not obscure. It is a demanding standard, which is why withdrawing a plea is far harder than entering one.

Talk With a Washington Criminal Defense Attorney

If you are facing criminal charges anywhere in King, Pierce, or Snohomish County — or you have questions about your right to counsel when withdrawing a guilty plea — get experienced guidance before making decisions that can follow you for years. The attorneys at Blair & Kim bring former prosecutor experience and a track record across more than 15,000 matters to every case they handle. Contact Blair & Kim today. Call (206) 622-6562 or reach our team online to discuss your situation with a Washington criminal defense attorney.

When a person faces multiple sex crime charges involving different complainants, one of the most important defense decisions is whether to move for separate trials. In State v. Krause, No. 103835-6 (Wash. Mar. 26, 2026), the Washington Supreme Court issued a 7-2 published decision that significantly raises the bar for defendants seeking to sever multiple rape charges. The ruling reverses a Court of Appeals decision that had granted severance and has immediate implications for how sex offense cases are tried throughout Washington, including in Snohomish County, where this case originated.

If you or someone you know is facing sex crime charges in Washington, the criminal defense team at Blair & Kim can help you understand your rights and build an effective defense strategy. Contact us for a confidential case evaluation.

What Happened in State v. Krause?

When someone faces domestic violence charges in Washington, every element of every count matters. In State v. Kane, No. 86684-2-I (Wash. Ct. App. March 30, 2026), the Washington Court of Appeals, Division One, reversed a conviction for interfering with domestic violence reporting because the State failed to prove the identity of the person whose 911 call was allegedly prevented. The ruling is a reminder that prosecutors bear the burden of proving every element of a DV-related offense beyond a reasonable doubt—and courts will hold them to it.

If you are facing DV charges in Seattle, Bellevue, or anywhere in the greater Puget Sound area, the attorneys at Blair Kim Moeller, PLLC can help you understand your options and mount an effective defense. Contact us for a confidential case evaluation.

What Happened in State v. Kane?

When someone is charged with felony harassment in Washington, the prosecution must prove that the accused knowingly made a threat to kill. But what mental state must the State prove regarding whether the defendant understood the threatening nature of those words? In a significant en banc decision filed on March 19, 2026, the Washington Supreme Court addressed this exact question in State v. Calloway, No. 103374-5, and the ruling has direct implications for anyone facing harassment charges in Seattle, Bellevue, and throughout King, Pierce, and Snohomish Counties.

If you or someone you know is facing harassment charges in Washington, the attorneys at Blair Kim Moeller, PLLC can help you understand how this new ruling may affect your case. Contact us for a confidential case evaluation.

What Did the Court Decide in State v. Calloway?

When police tell you that you’re “not under arrest” before questioning you, that statement does not automatically mean you’re free to leave. In State v. Magana-Arevalo, No. 103586-1 (Wash. Jan. 15, 2026), the Washington Supreme Court held that whether a suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes depends on the totality of the circumstances—not on a single officer’s claim that the suspect is free to go. The court also clarified the test for constitutional harmless error and reaffirmed that a suspect’s race and ethnicity are relevant factors in the custody analysis. If you are facing criminal charges in the Seattle area, this decision may affect whether statements you made to police can be used against you.

What Happened in State v. Magana-Arevalo?

On December 1, 2018, at approximately 6:00 a.m., Renton police and a SWAT team arrived at Cristian Magaña Arévalo’s partner’s apartment. Officers used a bullhorn to order everyone out, separated Magaña Arévalo from his partner and young child, zip-tied his wrists behind his back, placed him in a patrol car, and drove him to a staging area in a grocery store parking lot surrounded by law enforcement vehicles and officers.

Once there, a detective removed the zip ties and told Magaña Arévalo he was “not under arrest and was free to leave at any time.” The detective then questioned him in the back of an unmarked work truck while another armed detective sat in the front seat. No Miranda warnings were given. Two days later, on December 3, a detective went to his home for a follow-up interview—again without Miranda warnings. The trial court admitted all of these statements into evidence.

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The Washington Supreme Court has held that courts may consider race and ethnicity as relevant, objective factors when determining whether a person was in custody for Miranda purposes. In State v. Wasuge, No. 103530-6 (Wash. Jan. 15, 2026), the court’s unanimous en banc opinion also addressed the admissibility of expert testimony on blood alcohol concentration thresholds in “affected by” DUI cases. If you are facing DUI charges in the Seattle area, this ruling has significant implications for how your defense attorney can challenge the circumstances of your stop and arrest.

What Did the Court Decide in Wasuge?

The court addressed two issues. First, it held that even if a toxicology expert’s testimony about the American Medical Association’s recommended 0.05 percent BAC threshold was improperly admitted in an “affected by” DUI prosecution, the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of impairment. Second — and more broadly significant — the court held that race and ethnicity are relevant factors that courts may objectively consider under the “totality of the circumstances” test when analyzing whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes.

In an appropriate Washington drug case, drug court can allow a participant to obtain treatment and have criminal charges dropped.  The drug court program requires the participant to obtain treatment, submit to drug testing, and comply with a number of other requirements.  Failure to comply with the drug court agreement can have serious consequences, so it is important for a potential participant to fully understand the requirements of the program and consider if they will be able to comply.

A defendant challenged his termination from a drug court program and subsequent convictions in a recent unpublished case.  The state charged the defendant with physical control of a vehicle while under the influence and subsequently added another charge of physical control of a vehicle while under the influence and another for driving under the influence.

The defendant was accepted into a drug court program and agreed to abstain from drugs and alcohol, attend treatment sessions and appointments, live in sober housing, and have random urinalysis testing.  He also agreed that the reports, witness statements, lab and test results, and expert testing or examinations could be sufficient for a guilty finding on the pending charges if he was terminated from the program. He also agreed to waive certain rights if terminated.  If he completed the program, the charges would be dismissed with prejudice, but if he was terminated, the court could find him guilty based on the stipulated documents.

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The Washington Supreme Court recently considered a case in which a resentencing court declined to consider the defendant’s youthfulness at the time he committed the crime. According to Court’s opinion, the defendant pleaded guilty to second degree murder for a crime that occurred when he was 18 years old.  His offender score was 4, including a prior drug possession conviction. The standard sentencing range was 225-325 months and he was sentenced to 300 months.  The judge also imposed restitution, jointly and severally with his codefendants, including part of the victim’s funeral expenses.

The Washington Supreme Court held that former RCW 69.50.4013(1), part of the simple drug possession statute, violated due process rights and was void in State v. Blake. After State v. Blake, the defendant was eligible to have his unlawful drug possession conviction vacated. This caused his offender score to drop to 3, thereby lowering the standard range.

The defendant requested that his youthfulness be considered in resentencing. The resentencing judge stated, “. . . that’s a different issue than the one we’re talking about today.”

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In many Washington criminal cases, a plea agreement may be an appropriate resolution.  A plea agreement is a contract, and in some circumstances, that contract may be breached.  When the state agrees to a sentencing recommendation, it does not have to be enthusiastic in making that recommendation to the court, but it may breach the agreement if it undermines the terms of the agreement.  The state may undercut the plea agreement by providing the sentencing court with unsolicited information.  An appeals court considers the effect the state’s actions had and not the state’s intent. A defendant recently challenged his sentence, arguing the state had breached the plea agreement.

According to the appeals court’s unpublished opinion, the defendant drove the wrong way on an on-ramp and hit another vehicle.  Two people in the other car died and a third received treatment at the hospital.  The passenger in the defendant’s vehicle was also injured.  The defendant’s blood alcohol concentration was 0.14 within two hours after the wreck.

The state ultimately charged the defendant with two counts of vehicular homicide. The state had charged the defendant with vehicular assault of his passenger, but later dropped that charge. The defendant agreed to plead guilty on both counts and stipulated his offender score was 2. The state agreed to make a sentence recommendation of 95 months concurrent confinement, which was the low end of the sentencing range.

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