Washington law affords juvenile suspects additional protections. RCW 13.40.740 which became effective on January 1, 2022, requires law enforcement to “provide a juvenile with access to an attorney for consultation” in certain circumstances, including a custodial interrogation, before they waive any constitutional rights. A juvenile’s statements made under those circumstances are generally not admissible unless the juvenile received access to an attorney and made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver after being fully informed of their rights. Such statements may be use, however, for impeachment or if they were “made spontaneously.” A defendant recently challenged her conviction, based partly on the court allowing interrogation evidence when she had not consulted with an attorney.
According to the Washington Supreme Court, the sixteen-year-old defendant was involved in a brief fight with another teenage girl, H.D., at a mall. Several months later, she received messages from H.D. and others on January 29, 2021, about wanting to fight her. The following day, another teenage girl, S.P.T., asked H.D. to text the defendant and say H.D. wanted to fight her. The defendant testified she didn’t think H.D. actually wanted to fight and sent her address. She did not know H.D. sent her address to S.P.T.
After receiving a text H.D. was six minutes away, the defendant put a pocketknife in her pocket. She testified she always carried the knife. When S.P.T. arrived, the discussion escalated into a verbal altercation. The defendant testified she held the open knife behind her back because she was afraid the situation would become physical.
S.P.T. punched the defendant in the head, and then the defendant stabbed S.P.T. S.P.T. punched the defendant five more times after the defendant stopped slashing. According to the Court, S.P.T. punched the defendant about 38 times and the defendant slashed or stabbed her about 27 times within one minute.
The defendant’s boyfriend and one of S.P.T.’s friends recorded the fight. S.P.T. went to the car and the defendant went inside. Police officers came to the house a few minutes later. The officers called for medical assistance, but the defendant was told she did not need to go to the hospital immediately.
The police arrested the defendant, gave her a Miranda warning, and took her to the police station. The defendant’s mother told an officer that she or an attorney should be present before the defendant was questioned. The officer said she would tell her supervisor, but there was no evidence the request was further communicated.
The defendant was taken to an interrogation room about 20 to 30 minutes after the fight. She said her head hurt and she felt dizzy. Medical personnel checked her vital signs and blood sugar and determined she could be interrogated and did not require additional medical attention.
A detective read the defendant the Miranda warning specific to juveniles and she indicated she understood. He did not give her a written warning or tell her she could have her mother there while she was questioned. She did not ask about her rights or ask for an attorney.
She said S.P.T. had not overpowered her during the fight and she had not seen her with any weapons that day. She said she stopped stabbing S.P.T. because she got tired. The defendant said she stabbed S.P.T. in anger. The detective did not ask if she was afraid of S.P.T. When he asked about her injuries, she said her head still hurt.
After learning S.P.T. died, the detective told the defendant he had an update on her condition. She asked if it was good or bad news. He told her it was “bad news.” She declined hearing the details and did not ask about S.P.T.’s condition.
The defendant asked to talk to her mother after about five hours. She then learned S.P.T. had died. She asked for an attorney and the detective ended the interrogation.
The defendant was charged with three alternative murder counts, each with a special allegation she was armed with a deadly weapon.
According to the Court, the defendant turned 16 about a month before the incident. She was charged as an adult.
The state moved to admit character evidence, including the TikTok video of the mall fight, another TikTok video the defendant posted referencing the movie The Purge with the defendant stabbing a knife toward the camera, and an Instagram comment about the defendant having “stabbing energy.”
The court allowed the mall fight video as res gestae evidence. The res gestae doctrine allows the admission of other crimes or bad acts to complete the story of the crime by showing the immediate time and place where it occurred. The court also permitted the video referencing the Purge and the comment about “stabbing energy” as exceptions to ER 404(b) as evidence of motive, intent, and premeditated intent.
The court excluded evidence of S.P.T.’s blood alcohol concentration and evidence supporting the defendant’s fear of S.P.T. Following an offer of proof, the court allowed certain social media posts that the defendant testified made her afraid of S.P.T., but limited their use to show the defendant’s state of mind. The court excluded other social media posts and an image sent to the defendant by an unknown sender with text stating there was a “green light” on the defendant and that S.P.T. had a gang ready to take the defendant out. The court determined the image was not relevant because there was not a sufficient foundation connecting it to S.P.T. The court also determined it was hearsay. The court also excluded a screenshot of the Urban Dictionary definition of “green light” as an indication a gang had a hit on a person.
At a hearing to determine if the interrogation statements were admissible, the defendant testified she had not fully understood the Miranda warning and what it meant that what she said could be used against her. She also testified she did not understand whether she needed to tell the detective she wanted an attorney or how to get one. She said she did not think she would be allowed to have her mother with her and that she thought she had to do what the detective told her. She said she had previously been questioned, but had never been arrested or given Miranda warnings.
The trial court found the defendant made her statements “freely, knowingly, and voluntarily after being properly advised of her rights. . .”
The jury found the defendant guilty of the second degree murder charges, while armed with a deadly weapon.
The appeals court affirmed the conviction. The appeals court determined the Purge video and the comment about “stabbing energy” should have been excluded because they could have confused the jury but concluded it was a harmless error. The appeals court also held that RCW 13.40.740 was not intended to apply retroactively.
The Washington Supreme Court granted review.
Interrogation Evidence
The defendant argued RCW 13.40.740 prohibited the court from admitting her statements. The statute was enacted before her interrogation and took effect before the trial.
The Court considered whether application of the statute to the defendant’s statement would be retroactive. The defendant argued that the triggering event was not the custodial interrogation but the state’s attempt to admit the statement into evidence. The Court determined, however, that the decision to interrogate her without consultation with an attorney was the triggering event.
The statute provides that a juvenile’s statements are inadmissible if made law enforcement has contacted them “in a manner described under subsection (1). . . .” RCW 13.40.740(3). The Court concluded this language showed an intent to treat the events set forth in subsection (1) as the triggering event.
The interrogation occurred before the statute took effect, so the court held it would not apply unless there were grounds for retroactive application. A statutory amendment may be applied retroactively without an indication of retroactive intent if it corrects or clarifies ambiguous language. A statute may also apply retroactively if it is remedial and retroactive application would further that purpose. The defendant argued the statute was remedial.
For purposes of determining retroactivity, a statute is remedial if it provides a different remedy for a right that already exists. The Court held that the statute did not provide a remedy to a preexisting right, because a defendant may generally waive the right not to incriminate themselves without consulting with an attorney.
The defendant argued there was legislative intent for the statute to apply retroactively. The Court disagreed, however. The statute therefore did not apply to prohibit admission of evidence from the interrogation.
Waiver of Rights
The defendant also argued there was not substantial evidence she actually understood her rights sufficiently to waive them. The Court noted that her argument was based on the difference between the appearance of understanding and actual understanding. A defendant must actually understand their rights to make a knowing waiver of them.
The defendant was sixteen years old with no previous experience being interrogated as a suspect. There was no evidence she had previously been given a Miranda warning. She had been punched repeatedly in the head and said she felt dizzy and light-headed and her head hurt. She also testified she did not know how to ask for a lawyer. She said she did not fully understand the meaning of the warning her statements could be used against her in court. She also testified she thought she had to do what the detective told her. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court held there was not substantial evidence supporting the finding she had full awareness of her rights and the consequences of waiving them. The Court held the admission of the interrogation evidence violated the defendant’s right against self-incrimination.
Other evidence
The defendant challenged the exclusion of the “green light” image. The Court determined it was relevant and material to her self-defense claim because she testified she thought it was S.P.T. threatening her. The Court held the trial court erred in excluding it.
The Court noted it was the most probative piece of evidence showing her reasonable fear. The “green light” image was the only evidence the defendant thought showed a specific threat toward her. The jury could reject the self-defense claim if they did not find it credible, but she had the right to show them the evidence.
The Court also held the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the mall fight video based on res gestae. The mall fight was not near enough in time or related to the defendant’s state of mind.
The Court concluded the errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, vacated the verdict, and remanded the case.
Seek Legal Advice
If your child is being questioned by police, you should contact an experienced Washington juvenile defense attorney. Call Blair & Kim, PLLC at (206) 622-6562.