Articles Posted in Juvenile Cases

A Washington criminal defendant can raise a self-defense claim by offering some evidence that their actions occurred in circumstances of self-defense.  Once the defendant meets this low burden, the burden shifts to the state to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the absence of self-defense.

According to the appeals court’s opinion, the juvenile’s mother came into the 15-year-old juvenile’s room and saw her hide a cell phone under the covers. The juvenile refused to give it to her mother, and they scuffled over it.  The juvenile ultimately kicked her mother twice.

The state charged the juvenile with fourth degree assault with notice of a domestic violence allegation.  The juvenile testified , saying, “. . . the only reason I kicked her was to . . . get her off of me,” and “. . . I kicked her because she was on my leg, and it hurt.  And—because I knew at that point I knew I wasn’t going to get the phone back . . . .”

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Washington self-defense is an affirmative defense. A person may lawfully use force when they are about to be injured to prevent or try to prevent an offense against their person, when the force used is not more than necessary.  RCW 9A.16.020(3).  Force is necessary when there does not appear to be a reasonably effective alternative and the force used is reasonable to the lawful purpose.  RCW 9A.16.010(1).  A juvenile recently appealed his adjudication of guilt of second degree assault, claiming the state failed to disprove he acted in self-defense.

The appeals court’s unpublished opinion stated the juvenile got into a verbal altercation at school with another juvenile, identified by the appeals court’s opinion, as “J.S.” The juvenile called the other student a homophobic slur.  J.S. filed an incident report at the office.

They had a second altercation in the courtyard later that day.  The juvenile again called the other student a homophobic slur.  The other student advanced toward the juvenile.  The juvenile tried to walk away.  The juvenile started recording on his phone. The juvenile extended his arm as the other student approached, and the other student slapped him.  They both went to the ground. The other student was on top and started hitting the juvenile. The other student did not have or threaten to use a weapon, but the juvenile pulled a knife from his pocket and stabbed the other student six times in eight seconds.  The juvenile had not responded by pushing or hitting back, but just stabbed the other student.  The two did not really know each other and had not spoken before the altercations.

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A Washington juvenile record may be sealed if certain circumstances are met.  The court schedules an administrative sealing hearing at the disposition hearing, if the juvenile is eligible.  The hearing is to occur after the last of the following: the juvenile’s 18^th birthday, the anticipated end of the juvenile’s probation, and the juvenile’s anticipated release from confinement or completion of parole.  Certain offenses, including “most serious offenses,” certain drug offenses, and certain sex offenses, are not eligible for a sealing hearing.  The court is to seal the record if it finds at the time of the hearing that the juvenile is no longer on supervision for the case and has fully paid restitution to the person named in the order, excluding any restitution owed to an entity providing insurance or health care coverage.  If the court finds the juvenile is still on supervision, then it is to continue the hearing within 30 days after the anticipated completion of the supervision. If the court finds the juvenile is not still on supervision for the case but has failed to fully pay restitution to the person named in the order, the court is to deny sealing the record and issue an order that specifies the restitution that is unpaid to the person and directs the juvenile on how to pursue sealing the record.  RCW 13.50.260.  The state recently appealed the sealing of a juvenile record, arguing the juvenile had failed to fully pay restitution.

According to the appeals court’s opinion, the juvenile pleaded guilty to second degree malicious mischief and agreed to pay restitution.  The court ordered him to pay $1,233.17 in restitution and set a date for a hearing to seal the record.

The state argued at that hearing that the juvenile failed to fully pay restitution so the record could not be sealed pursuant to RCW 13.50.260(1)(d).  The juvenile court still sealed the record, finding the juvenile was eligible for the record to be sealed because he had “paid in full the amount of restitution owing,” but also that “the remaining amount of restitution . . . is $613.17.”

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Washington second degree criminal trespass is a misdemeanor. To convict a person of second degree criminal trespass, the state must show that they knowingly entered or remained unlawfully on someone else’s property.  A juvenile recently challenged a guilty adjudication for second degree criminal trespass, arguing there was insufficient evidence that he had knowingly entered and unlawfully remained on Port property.

According to the appeals court’s opinion, the police received a complaint from a Port employee that the thirteen-year-old juvenile was skateboarding on Port property.  The property was posted with several signs prohibiting skateboarding.  The employee stated Port employees has contacted the juvenile and asked him to stop, but he had responded with profanity.

The officer issued the juvenile a no trespassing notice and told him he was trespassed from Port property for life.  The juvenile, the officer, and the employee all signed the notice.

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In a Washington deferred disposition in a juvenile case, the juvenile stipulates to the admissibility of the facts in the police report, acknowledges the report will be entered a used to support a finding of guilt and impose disposition if they do not comply with the terms of supervision, waive the rights to speedy disposition and to call and confront witnesses, and acknowledge the direct consequences of a finding of guilty and of a disposition, if entered. The court then defers entry of an order of disposition and places the juvenile on community supervision, with any conditions deemed appropriate by the court.  At the end of the period of community supervision, the court determines if the juvenile is entitled to dismissal based on statutory requirements.  If so, the conviction is vacated and the court dismisses the case with prejudice.  If the court vacates the conviction, and the juvenile is at least 18 years old and has paid the full amount of restitution owed to the individual victim, the court also orders the case to be sealed. If the juvenile is not yet 18, the court will schedule an administrative sealing hearing within 30 days of the juvenile’s 18^th birthday. If the juvenile is not entitled to dismissal, the court revokes the deferred disposition and enters an order of disposition.  RCW 13.40.127.

A juvenile who entered a deferred disposition for attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle recently challenged the driver’s license suspension and firearms right revocation imposed upon him. Pursuant to RCW 46.20.285, the department of licensing revokes the license or permit of a person convicted of attempting to elude a police vehicle.  A juvenile’s right to possess a firearm is revoked if they are adjudicated guilty of any felony under RCW 9.41.040, including attempting to elude.   Case law has held that a juvenile is considered to be convicted when they enter into a deferred disposition.  A juvenile in deferred disposition who meets the requirements will have their license suspended or firearms rights revoked until the adjudication is vacated.

Washington counties may create alternative therapeutic court programs pursuant to RCW 2.30.030.  Therapeutic court programs allow juveniles to have their case dismissed after completing the program.  The case is removed from prosecution and the juvenile is not adjudicated guilty.  Because they are not adjudicated guilty, juveniles in therapeutic court programs do not face driver’s license suspension or firearms rights revocation.

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Washington criminal defendants have the right for the jury to be instructed on applicable lesser-included crimes if each of the elements of the lesser offense is a necessary element of the charged offense and the evidence supports an inference the lesser crime was committed instead of the greater offense.  There must also be affirmative evidence of the defendant’s theory.

A defendant recently challenged her conviction because the trial court denied her request to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses.  According to the appeals court’s unpublished opinion, the defendant told another sophomore student that a senior, identified by the court as “RV,” had inappropriately touched her and other girls.  She had complained to the administration, but did not receive a response.  She and the other student, identified as “JC” developed a plan to “take out” or “kill” RV, according to statements she gave the police.  She said she was to convince RV to meet her at a market across from the school and JC would attack him.

The state presented evidence of messages associated with the defendant’s social media account convincing RV to her.  JC went behind the market with a knife and a red t-shirt over his face.  RV and the defendant went inside the market to buy lunch.  The defendant testified she only intended to get lunch and return to school.  As they were leaving the market, other students were “talkin’ about a guy in the field with a red mask.” They went behind the store and RV saw someone in a red mask stand up and point at him.  He decided to go back to school.  JC and the defendant spoke, and then both went back to school, too.

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Pursuant to RCW 43.43.754, individuals convicted of certain crimes and juvenile offenses in Washington must give a DNA sample.  Two juveniles recently challenged separate court orders requiring them to give DNA samples after they were granted deferred disposition. Each of the juveniles was charged with theft of a motor vehicle arising from separate incidents, with one of the juveniles having several additional charges.  They each appealed and their cases were consolidated before the Washington Supreme Court.

In the lead opinion, the Washington Supreme Court noted that RCW 43.43.754 fails to define the meaning of “conviction.”  The court also pointed out that the meaning of “conviction” is not clear in statutes involving juveniles. In such circumstances, the court must consider the context and purposes of the statute in interpreting what is meant by “conviction.”

The court first considered other relevant statutes.  The court noted that juvenile adjudications finding guilt are considered convictions under the Sentencing Reform Act.  RCW 9.94A.030(9).  The court also concluded that standard and law dictionary definitions supported the definition in the Sentencing Reform Act.

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The value of property can affect the degree and seriousness of a Washington theft crime.  In a recent unpublished case, a juvenile challenged his second degree theft conviction, arguing the trial court had used the wrong methodology for determining the value of the property.

A deputy testified he met with the juvenile and his mother after responding to a call reporting a possible theft.  The deputy testified the juvenile admitted he had taken a ring out of his mother’s jewelry box.

A jeweler testified that the replacement cost of the ring was $1,200, based on making a new ring.  The jeweler also testified that used jewelry did not get the same price as new and that the ring might be sold to a jeweler for $340.  A dealer might be able to sell it then for $600 or $700.

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In State v. Blake in 2021, the Washington Supreme Court determined that Washington’s strict liability drug statute violated due process because it “criminalize[d] innocent and passive possession.” This case has had a tremendous impact on Washington drug possession cases.  A Washington criminal conviction that is based on an unconstitutional statute is required to be vacated.  A number of cases under the previous version of R.C.W. 69.50.4013(1) have been overturned as a result of the Blake decision.  Recently, a juvenile appealed his drug possession adjudication under a different statute, arguing it should also be vacated due to the court’s holding in Blake.

The juvenile was found guilty of violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act under former R.C.W. 69.50.4014. He appealed, arguing the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in Blake required his adjudication to be vacated.  He argued the applicable version of R.C.W. 69.50.4014 was unconstitutional and void based on the reasoning in Blake.

The state argued that Blake did not void the applicable version of R.C.W. 69.50.4014 because that charge carried a lesser punishment than the statute Blake found was unconstitutional. The appeals court rejected the state’s argument, noting the Blake court did not base its decision on the severity of the punishment. The Blake decision was instead based on the statute’s lack of an intent element.

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Community supervision and probation are often preferable to confinement, but some people can find it difficult to comply with their times at times. Additionally, the requirements for the state to prove a violation of such terms do not require the same level of proof as would be required for new Washington criminal charges.  In a recent case, a juvenile challenged the constitutionality of RCW 13.40.200 because of the burden of proof it requires for violations.

The juvenile offender was 13 years old when she pleaded guilty to fourth degree assault. She was sentenced to 3 days of confinement, 12 months of community supervision, and 16 hours of community service. She violated the community supervision conditions multiple times.

After four violation hearings and 61 days of additional confinement, she contested allegations she had failed to go to school and follow rules and curfew. She moved to challenge the constitutionality of RCW 13.40.200. RCW 13.40.200 sets forth the procedure and punishment for a juvenile offender’s failure to comply with an order for community supervision. She argued section (2) of the statute violates due process because it requires the juvenile to disprove the willfulness of the violation.  She also argued section 3 allows for the imposition of confinement based on a preponderance standard until the maximum adult sentence.  She argued the state should prove all elements of a willful violation beyond a reasonable doubt once the offender’s confinement exceeds the standard range.

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