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A trial court in a Washington divorce has broad discretion to make a just and equitable property division.  RCW 26.09.080 sets forth certain factors that the court must consider in making a just and equitable property distribution, but those factors are not exclusive.  The trial court must consider the nature and extent of both the community property and any separate property, the length of the marriage, and each spouse’s economic circumstances when the division takes effect.  The court must fairly consider the circumstances and future needs of both parties. An appeals court generally affirms a property distribution unless there was a manifest abuse of discretion.  A manifest abuse of discretion occurs if there is a patent disparity in the economic circumstances of the parties as a result of the decree.  A former husband recently challenged a property division in which his former wife was awarded a $12,000 judgment.

The parties got married in April 2018 and separated in October 2020.  According to the appeals court’s unpublished opinion, they did not have many assets or debts.  They bought a home during the marriage. The wife transferred her interest in the home to the husband in 2019 via a quitclaim deed, though her reasons for doing so were in dispute.

The husband asked that the court award each party the bank and retirement accounts in their own name and the vehicle and any personal property in their possession. He asked the court to award him the home. He agreed to assume the community debt if he did not have to pay spousal maintenance.

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“Coercive control” was added to Washington’s definition of “domestic violence” in 2022.  Although the statute provides a number of examples of coercive control, there have been few appellate cases interpreting it.  In an unpublished opinion, a Washington appeals court recently reviewed a domestic violence protection order, granted partly upon a finding that the husband had engaged in acts of coercive control.

In her petition for a domestic violence protection order, the wife indicated the husband had or owned firearms and that his use of firearms or other dangerous weapons “would be a serious and immediate threat. . .”  The petition also stated he “threatened to ‘kill himself’ while holding a gun.” She also stated he would say he was a burden and should end his life about once a month.   The petition stated the husband had “23 failed suicide attempts from his childhood.” The wife alleged he had more than 15 firearms in the house, with at least three in the bedroom and that ammunition was nearby.  She stated she wanted a divorce but did not feel it would be safe to tell the husband while he had guns.

The husband denied the allegations.  He averred he had never threatened the wife.  He also averred he had never attempted to kill himself, pointed a firearm at his head and threatened to kill himself, or said he “should end [his] life.”

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Generally, Washington’s “corpus delicti” rule requires the state to prove that the crime occurred, independent of the defendant’s own statements.  The state must provide sufficient evidence in its case-in-chief.  However, if the defendant presents evidence during their case-in-chief, they waive the challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as of that point and an appeals court may consider all of the evidence to determine if there was sufficient evidence to support an inference that the crime happened.

A defendant recently challenged his conviction for felony violation of a protection order, arguing the state had presented insufficient evidence of the knowledge element of the corpus delicti because it relied on statements he had made to the responding officer.

The defendant’s grandaunt obtained a temporary protection order prohibiting the defendant from coming within 1,000 feet of her home on January 18, 2022. According to the appeals court’s unpublished opinion, the next day she heard someone try to unlock her door and saw the defendant through the peephole.  She told him he was not supposed to be there and he had to leave.  He first sat down and smoked a cigarette before leaving.

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The Sixth Circuit recently determined a school can be liable in a Title IX case for not responding to social media activity by students.  A Nashville, Tennessee, high school student filed suit against the public school system, alleging it was deliberately indifferent to harassment related to her sexual assault and participation in the subsequent investigation.  She alleged the school system was deliberately indifferent before the assault and after the assault, and also alleged equal protection claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

According to the Sixth Circuit’s opinion, a video was recorded of the plaintiff during a non-consensual sexual encounter and posted on social media and third party websites.  Other students harassed – the plaintiff.

The school’s Executive Principal learned about the video on the evening the incident occurred and the school set up a meeting with the plaintiff’s mother the next day.  The plaintiff and her family received harassment and threats from other students on social media. The mother made a list of students who made the threats.

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Trial courts have broad discretion to create a parenting plan, and abuse that discretion only if they make a decision that is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons.  In re Marriage of Littlefield. A mother recently appealed a parenting plan allowing the father parenting time on the Sabbath both parents claimed to observe according to the Seventh-day Adventist faith.

The final parenting plan identified the mother as the primary parent and the parties entered an order by agreement for the father’s visitation.

The father objected when the mother moved for relocation.  A temporary order allowed the move and gave the father one weekend a month for eight hours each on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday.

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Fines, fees, and penalties can add up and result in a significant financial impact on criminal defendants and their families.  These legal financial obligations can be particularly burdensome when imposed on juvenile offenders, who in some cases may be too young to work and who often come from low-income families.  If they cannot pay, the outstanding debt may affect the juvenile’s ability to obtain credit, housing, or even a job.

Effective July 1, 2023, the legislature amended the penalty assessment statute, RCW 7.68.035, to remove penalty assessments for juveniles and prohibit penalty assessments under that statute for adult defendants found to be indigent.  The legislature also enacted a new statute, RCW 13.40.058, which provides that a court cannot impose or collect any fine, administrative fee, cost, or surcharge from a juvenile or their parent or guardian in connection with a Washington juvenile offender proceeding. This prohibition specifically includes, but is not limited to DNA collection fees, diversion fees, and victims’ penalty assessments. The result of these two laws is that a court can no longer impose any legal financial obligations on a juvenile, except restitution.

Prior to the amendment, RCW 7.68.035 required the court to impose a $100 penalty assessment for each case or cause of action for a “most serious offense” or a sex offense under RCW chapter 9A.44 for which a juvenile was adjudicated. “Most serous offenses” include class A felonies, second degree assault, first and second degree manslaughter, a felony with a deadly weapon verdict, and other specified offenses.  The amendment also removed the requirement for the court to order up to seven hours of community restitution when a juvenile was adjudicated of an offense with a victim that did not constitute a most serious offense or sex offense, unless the court found the order would not be practicable for the juvenile.

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A court sentencing a Washington criminal defendant to community custody generally has broad discretion in imposing conditions.  Appeal courts only overturn a community custody condition if it is “manifestly unreasonable.”  An unconstitutional condition is manifestly unreasonable.  A community custody condition must be sufficiently specific to give the defendant “fair warning” of the conduct that is prohibited in order to satisfy due process requirements.  A condition must identify the conduct that is prohibited in a way an ordinary person could understand and set clear standards so enforcement is not arbitrary.  See State v. Irwin.

A defendant recently appealed a community custody condition that prohibited “hostile contact” with law enforcement and first responders.  According to the published opinion of the appeals court, the defendant went to a hotel for a party and got into an altercation.  When a security guard attempted to intervene, the defendant lunged at him with a knife.  The guard was able to successfully disarm the defendant and confiscate his knife.

The responding officer arrived to the defendant sitting in the hotel lobby, appearing angry and intoxicated.  Although the officer and security guard intended to let him go, the defendant moved toward the security guard aggressively.  He tried to elbow a couple of the officers.   One of the officers finally subdued him by using his taser.

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Representative Lisa McClain, Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Health Care and Financial Services, and Representative Virginia Foxx, Chairwoman of the Committee on Education and the Workforce, recently initiated an investigation into the Department of Education’s proposed Title IX regulations. Their November 16, 2023, letter to Department of Education Secretary Miguel Cardona expressed concerns about changes to due process protections as well as inclusion of gender identity discrimination within the definition of “sex discrimination.” They are investigating whether outside groups had improper influence over drafting the proposed rules.

The letter stated that the proposed changes would “eviscerate the safeguards that ensured due process for all students.” The letter points to the proposed reinstatement of the “single-investigator model” as an example and states that federal and state courts had ruled against universities more than half the time in lawsuits filed under the 2011 policy when this model was previously in effect.

The letter also alleges that the proposed inclusion of “discrimination on the basis of gender identity” in the definition of “sex discrimination” would “harm women and girls across the country.”

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In some circumstances, a Washington criminal defendant may be eligible for a sentencing alternative, including a parenting sentence alternative, a drug offender sentencing alternative (“DOSA”), or a mental health sentencing alternative (“MHSA”).  The defendant must meet certain conditions to qualify for these alternatives.  A defendant is only eligible for an MHSA if: their conviction is for a felony but is not a sex offense or a serious violent offense, they have a diagnosis for a serious mental illness recognized by the current mental health diagnostic manual, the judge determines the defendant and community would benefit from treatment and supervision, and the defendant is willing to participate.  RCW 9.94A.695(1). If the court determines that an MHSA is appropriate, it imposes a term of community custody within a range determined based on the length of the standard range sentence, but the court has discretion in determining the actual length of the community custody within the ranges.  RCW 9.94A.695(4).

A defendant recently challenged his sentence for felony violation of a no-contact order, arguing the court did not follow the proper procedure set forth in the statute when it denied his request for an MHSA.

According to the unpublished opinion of the appeals court, the defendant was arrested outside his ex-wife’s apartment in April, 2021.  Two active no-contact orders prohibited him from contacting her or being within 1,000 feet of her apartment.  He had served a sentence for a prior violation and recently been released.  He was also under the conditions of a DOSA.

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Who gets to claim the children as dependents on their tax returns can be a contentious issue in a Washington custody case.  A father recently sought a contempt order against the mother when she claimed one of the children as a dependent.

According to the appeals court’s unpublished opinion, the parties entered into an agreed child support order when they divorced in 2009.  The trial court’s final child support order provided that the mother would have the right to claim the child identified as T.A.R. as a dependent on her taxes and the father had the right to claim the child identified as M.A.R. The order further provided that “WHEN THERE IS ONLY ONE CHILD ELIGIBLE FOR TAX DEDUCTION PURPOSES,” the mother would have the right to claim the children for even years and the other parent would have the right to claim them “for the opposite years.”

After learning the mother claimed T.A.R. in the 2021 tax year,  the father moved for an order to show cause why the mother should not be held in contempt, arguing she violated the order when she claimed T.A.R. in 2021 after M.A.R. had  turned eighteen. He argued the alternating clause applied after M.A.R. turned eighteen because T.A.R. was then the only “child.” He acknowledged he could have claimed M.A.R., but argued he only would have received $500 by doing so, while he would have a $6,000 tax exemption if he claimed T.A.R.

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