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The Washington Supreme Court has held that courts may consider race and ethnicity as relevant, objective factors when determining whether a person was in custody for Miranda purposes. In State v. Wasuge, No. 103530-6 (Wash. Jan. 15, 2026), the court’s unanimous en banc opinion also addressed the admissibility of expert testimony on blood alcohol concentration thresholds in “affected by” DUI cases. If you are facing DUI charges in the Seattle area, this ruling has significant implications for how your defense attorney can challenge the circumstances of your stop and arrest.

What Did the Court Decide in Wasuge?

The court addressed two issues. First, it held that even if a toxicology expert’s testimony about the American Medical Association’s recommended 0.05 percent BAC threshold was improperly admitted in an “affected by” DUI prosecution, the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of impairment. Second — and more broadly significant — the court held that race and ethnicity are relevant factors that courts may objectively consider under the “totality of the circumstances” test when analyzing whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes.

A Washington appeals court has confirmed that trial courts cannot order joint decision-making in a parenting plan when both parents have a history of domestic violence. In In re Marriage of Thiess, No. 87345-8-I (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2026), Division One held that former RCW 26.09.191(1) prohibits mutual decision-making whenever at least one parent has a founded history of domestic violence — even when both parents have such findings. If you are going through a divorce or custody dispute in King County that involves domestic violence allegations, this ruling could directly affect how your parenting plan is structured.

What Did the Court Decide in Thiess?

The Court of Appeals reversed a trial court’s order requiring joint decision-making between two parents who had both been found to have committed domestic violence. The mother had a history of physical domestic violence, and the father had a history of emotional domestic violence as defined under RCW 7.105.010. Despite those findings, the trial court ordered joint decision-making, reasoning that restricting both parents did not make “common sense.”

Division One disagreed. The court held that former RCW 26.09.191(1) uses mandatory language — “shall not require mutual decision-making” — and that the statute applies when any parent has a history of domestic violence. The court remanded the case and ordered the trial court to assign sole decision-making authority to one parent.

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Sometimes when a student has suffered severe disciplinary action following an unfair Title IX investigation and disciplinary proceeding, they may pursue their own Title IX claim against the school.  A federal court in Arizona recently considered a motion to dismiss a male student’s Title IX, § 1983, and state law claims after he was suspended for sexual misconduct.

The plaintiff, “John Doe,” and “Jane Roe” each filed student conduct complaints against each other following a sexual encounter on an Arizona university campus.  Jane filed a Title IX complaint against John and he was found responsible for sexual misconduct.  He sued the university against the university’s Board of Regents and several individual defendants alleging violation of Title IX, violations of 42 U.S.C.  § 1983 and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

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In most cases, a person protected by a Washington civil protect order wants the order and limitations it provides.  A vulnerable adult protection order, however, is commonly sought by someone else on behalf of the vulnerable person, and in some cases, the allegedly vulnerable person may object to the order.  In a recent unpublished case, a man recently challenged a vulnerable adult protection order issued against him.

The petitioner sought a vulnerable adult protection order  as attorney for a woman who was over 80 years old and had dementia and other health issues.  She alleged the respondent had “abandoned, abused, financially exploited, or neglected” the woman, identifying specific incidents.  The petition alleged the respondent had taken the woman from her retirement community to her former home twice, which upset her when she learned the place had been rented.  The petitioner also alleged the respondent had given the woman alcohol twice when he was aware she had issues with alcohol abuse.  The petitioner provided declarations from herself, the woman’s brother, another of the woman’s relatives, and an agent with a durable power of attorney.

The respondent submitted his own declaration, transcripts of calls with the woman, and two character reference letters.

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In an appropriate Washington drug case, drug court can allow a participant to obtain treatment and have criminal charges dropped.  The drug court program requires the participant to obtain treatment, submit to drug testing, and comply with a number of other requirements.  Failure to comply with the drug court agreement can have serious consequences, so it is important for a potential participant to fully understand the requirements of the program and consider if they will be able to comply.

A defendant challenged his termination from a drug court program and subsequent convictions in a recent unpublished case.  The state charged the defendant with physical control of a vehicle while under the influence and subsequently added another charge of physical control of a vehicle while under the influence and another for driving under the influence.

The defendant was accepted into a drug court program and agreed to abstain from drugs and alcohol, attend treatment sessions and appointments, live in sober housing, and have random urinalysis testing.  He also agreed that the reports, witness statements, lab and test results, and expert testing or examinations could be sufficient for a guilty finding on the pending charges if he was terminated from the program. He also agreed to waive certain rights if terminated.  If he completed the program, the charges would be dismissed with prejudice, but if he was terminated, the court could find him guilty based on the stipulated documents.

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In some cases, circumstances change after a court orders child support.  A Washington child support order may be modified if there has been a substantial change in circumstances, if it has been a year or more since the order was entered and it causes a “severe economic hardship. . .” or if it has been two years or more since the last order, adjustment or modification was entered, and there have been changes in the income of either party. RCW 26.09.170.  In a recent unpublished case, a father challenged a modification to his child support modification after the court found he had inherited more than $5.1 million and calculated his gross monthly income at $425,000.

According to the appeals court’s opinion, the father petitioned for divorce in 2018 and the court ultimately issued a final divorce decree, parenting plan, and child support order.

The mother petitioned for modification of the child support order several years later. The father testified he had recently come into an inheritance and the wife offered evidence to show he had used the inheritance to support himself while he was not employed.  The court held that a modification was warranted due to the inheritance, along with the mother’s new income and her own inheritance.  According to the court’s order, the mother had received $186,819 and the father more than $5.1 million in non-retirement assets and sums. The court also noted the mother’s new income was $5,883.14.

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A federal court in South Carolina recently granted a university’s motion to compel arbitration of a case involving a former student’s claim arising from his suspension after being accused of sexual harassment and stalking.

The plaintiff was a former student at the South Carolina campus of a for-profit university.  He alleged that another student falsely represented that he had stalked and sexually harassed her.  He further alleged he was dismissed from the university’s Licensed Practical Nursing program for a semester in March 17, 2023 without a Title IX investigation or hearing. The plaintiff alleged the complainant’s allegations were found to be false, but she was not disciplined.

The plaintiff claimed there was “a hostile educational environment” when he went back to school after the suspension.  He also alleged that a member of the university’s administration was aware that another student had threatened his life but allowed the student to remain in the program without reprimand.

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Washington law affords juvenile suspects additional protections.  RCW 13.40.740 which became effective on January 1, 2022, requires law enforcement to “provide a juvenile with access to an attorney for consultation” in certain circumstances, including a custodial interrogation, before they waive any constitutional rights.  A juvenile’s statements made under those circumstances are generally not admissible unless the juvenile received access to an attorney and made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver after being fully informed of their rights. Such statements may be use, however, for impeachment or if they were “made spontaneously.” A defendant recently challenged her conviction, based partly on the court allowing interrogation evidence when she had not consulted with an attorney.

According to the Washington Supreme Court, the sixteen-year-old defendant was involved in a brief fight with another teenage girl, H.D., at a mall. Several months later, she received messages from H.D. and others on January 29, 2021, about wanting to fight her. The following day, another teenage girl, S.P.T., asked H.D. to text the defendant and say H.D. wanted to fight her.  The defendant testified she didn’t think H.D. actually wanted to fight and sent her address. She did not know H.D. sent her address to S.P.T.

After receiving a text H.D. was six minutes away, the defendant put a pocketknife in her pocket. She testified she always carried the knife. When S.P.T. arrived, the discussion escalated into a verbal altercation.  The defendant testified she held the open knife behind her back because she was afraid the situation would become physical.

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The Washington Supreme Court recently considered a case in which a resentencing court declined to consider the defendant’s youthfulness at the time he committed the crime. According to Court’s opinion, the defendant pleaded guilty to second degree murder for a crime that occurred when he was 18 years old.  His offender score was 4, including a prior drug possession conviction. The standard sentencing range was 225-325 months and he was sentenced to 300 months.  The judge also imposed restitution, jointly and severally with his codefendants, including part of the victim’s funeral expenses.

The Washington Supreme Court held that former RCW 69.50.4013(1), part of the simple drug possession statute, violated due process rights and was void in State v. Blake. After State v. Blake, the defendant was eligible to have his unlawful drug possession conviction vacated. This caused his offender score to drop to 3, thereby lowering the standard range.

The defendant requested that his youthfulness be considered in resentencing. The resentencing judge stated, “. . . that’s a different issue than the one we’re talking about today.”

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The court in a Washington divorce case has broad discretion in characterizing the parties’ assets.  Characterization is determined as of the date of acquisition and generally does not change.  Separate property continues to be separate while it can be traced or identified.  Property acquired during the marriage may be separate property if it was acquired with the traceable proceeds of a spouse’s separate property.  There is, however, a presumption that property acquired while the parties are married is community property. A spouse claiming that property acquired during the marriage is separate has the burden of showing it is separate through clear and convincing evidence.  In a recent unpublished case, a former wife challenged the characterization of property purchased during the marriage.

Before the parties got married in 1999, they signed a prenuptial agreement stating the husband would maintain ownership of the property he had at the time of the marriage.  He owned property in Montana before the marriage.

The parties divorced in 2002.  The court awarded the husband the property he owned when they got married in accordance with the prenuptial agreement.

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