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Washington family law provides for child support to include post-secondary education in some circumstances.  Before awarding this type of support, the court must first determine if the child is dependent on the parents for his or her reasonable necessities.  The court has discretion in determining how long to award the support, based on a number of factors.  The statute requires the child to be enrolled in an accredited institution, pursuing studies commensurate with his or her vocational goals, and to be in good academic standing.  The statute requires an automatic suspension if the child fails to comply with these requirements. RCW 26.19.090.

If a court does award post-secondary education support, it must determine the consequences of the child’s failure to comply with the conditions in the order.  A Washington appeals court recently considered this issue in an unpublished opinion.

The trial court had modified the child support order to include post-secondary education for one of the couple’s daughters in 2014.  The order included a condition that the daughter “enroll in and attend school full-time.”  The daughter was not a full-time student during the spring term of 2015, due to medical issues.  A court commissioner granted the father’s motion to terminate support for the daughter.  The superior court then denied the mother’s motion for revision and entered a judgment against the mother for the tuition the husband had paid and attorney fees.  The court also denied the mother’s motion for reconsideration, and she appealed.

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Matters related to children are often the most contentious aspects of a divorce.  Ideally, parents will work together to reach a mutually agreeable arrangement regarding custody, decision-making, and support.  When the parties cannot agree, however, the court may have to decide these issues based on factual findings and statutory requirements.

A Washington appeals court recently considered several issues related to parenting in a recent case. A temporary order granted equal residential time, appointed a guardian ad litem, and authorized joint decision-making.  A subsequent stipulated order stated the parties agreed to update each other on the child’s health and follow the recommendations of his health care providers.  Following the trial, however, the trial court entered an order limiting the father’s residential time based on findings of abusive use of conflict, neglect, and not acting in the child’s best interest.

The trial court determined the father’s net monthly income was more than $15,000, while the mother’s was less than $400, making the combined income greater than the top support schedule tier.  RCW 26.19.020.  The trial court ordered a transfer payment of $3,000 per month, which was greater than the amount provided in the statute.  The husband appealed the child support order and the parenting plan.

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The prosecution is generally required to prove some level of intent, or mens rea, to succeed in obtaining a guilty verdict in a criminal case.  Some offenses, however, are strict liability offenses, meaning the prosecution does not have to prove intent.  A Washington appeals court recently considered whether the vehicular homicide and vehicular assault statutes require the prosecution to prove a mens rea of ordinary negligence in the case of driving under the influence.

In a recent case, the defendant appealed convictions for vehicular homicide and vehicular assault, arguing the jury instructions were erroneous because they allowed the jury to find her guilty without a finding of ordinary negligence.

According to the opinion, the defendant’s truck spun out on an icy bridge, slid off the road, and hit two people who were investigating an accident scene.  One man died, and the other was seriously injured.   The officers restrained the defendant and had blood drawn at the hospital.  The tests revealed a blood alcohol concentration of .09.

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Divorces can be very complicated when a valuable business is part of the community property.  The party who keeps the business may be unable to pay their spouse’s share immediately, resulting in long-term property distribution payments and interest.

A Washington appeals court recently addressed these issues in the unpublished case of In Re: Marriage of Cheng.  The wife had graduated from Harvard Business School in 2002 but had not really been employed since.  The husband had a consulting and distance learning company that the court valued at $3.6 million.  The trial court awarded the wife $640,000 in maintenance to be paid over 44 months and a judgment of $1.455 million with 6% interest over 15 years as property distribution. The court also awarded child support greater than the standard calculation.  The husband appealed.

The husband argued that the wife was receiving an improper double recovery.  Trial courts are to consider “all relevant factors including but not limited to” those listed in RCW 26.09.090(1) when considering how much maintenance should be awarded.  The maintenance award must be just, but the trial court otherwise has broad discretion.  One of the listed factors is the division of community property.    If the maintenance and property award are paid from the same asset in a way that unfairly burdens the spouse that is paying, the maintenance may duplicate the property division.

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Generally, a property owner is liable for injuries to its customers only if it has actual or constructive notice of the hazardous condition that resulted in the injury.  Washington law recognizes an exception, however, when the nature of the business and its operational methods make the existence of unsafe conditions reasonably foreseeable.  This exception, set forth in Pimentel v. Roundup Company, is known as the Pimentel or self-service exception because it applies to self-service operations.  “Self-service” simply means that the customers handle the goods and serve themselves.

There are three factors that must be met for the Pimentel exception to apply.  First, the injury must occur in a self-service area.  Second, the hazardous condition that caused the injury must also be in the self-service area.  Finally, the businesss mode of operation must inherently create a hazardous condition that is reasonably foreseeable.

The Pimentel exception commonly arises in a slip and fall context.  In a recent unpublished case, however, the Washington Court of Appeals applied it in an unusual context.  In Craig v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the exception was applied when a man was bitten by a rattlesnake in a Wal-Mart garden center.

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Implied consent is an important aspect of DUI defense.  The Washington implied consent statute, RCW 46.20.308, requires officers to inform a driver suspected of DUI of certain consequences of refusing or submitting to a breath test.  When recreational marijuana use was decriminalized in Washington, the legislature set a legal limit for THC levels in the blood while driving.  It also added a warning to the implied consent statute, stating the consequences of a breath test that indicated the driver’s THC concentration was above the legal limit.  The available breath tests, however, could not measure THC.  Although the statute has since been amended again, there were cases that arose under the language requiring the THC warning.

This blog previously discussed the case of State v. Murray, wherein the Court of Appeals found that the defendant’s breath test results were not admissible because the officer did not provide the THC warning.

The Supreme Court of Washington recently reviewed that case, consolidated with another.  The trooper involved in each case used an identical form in providing the implied consent warning.  The warning did not include statutory language regarding THC, but it advised the defendant that he or she was subject to a driver’s license suspension, revocation, or denial if the test indicated he or she was under the influence of alcohol.  The form stated the defendant had the right to refuse the test, but if he or she did so, his or her driver’s license, permit, or privilege to drive would be revoked or denied for at least a year, and that refusal could be used in a criminal trial.  It further stated that the driver’s license, permit, or privilege to drive could be suspended, revoked, or denied for at least 90 days if the defendant was at least 21 years old, the test indicated a blood alcohol level of .08 or more, and the defendant was in violation of RCW 46.61.502, Driving Under the Influence, or RCW 46.1.504, Physical Control of a Vehicle under the Influence.

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The right-of-way can be an important issue in automobile accident cases.  It can be difficult for a plaintiff who fails to yield the right-of-way to recover compensation from the other driver.  A Washington appeals court recently reviewed a case in which the plaintiff was hit by an oncoming vehicle as the plaintiff attempted to turn left in Colburn v. Trees.

The accident occurred when the plaintiff, traveling north, turned left at an intersection and was struck by the defendant, who was going south.  There were no turn lanes at the intersection.  The defendant approached in the left lane, but he moved to the right lane after seeing a bus preparing for a left turn in the left lane.  The bus partially obstructed each driver’s view.  Each entered the intersection on a green light.  The defendant continued south, while the plaintiff crossed the southbound lanes to turn left.  The defendant tried to swerve but still struck the plaintiff’s vehicle.

The plaintiff sued the defendant, and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defense.  The plaintiff appealed.

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Emotions run high during divorce, and sometimes unfortunately the parties will try to hurt each other.  When a party to a divorce intentionally damages property or wastes the couple’s assets, the other party may seek a remedy through the court. In the recent case of In re Marriage of Fellows, a Washington appeals court reviewed an order for contempt of court against a wife who allegedly damaged the couple’s home.

The wife, Michaela, appealed the order finding her in contempt of court for violating the dissolution decree.  The trial court found that she had intentionally violated its order by damaging the couple’s home.

The decree awarded the home to the husband, Charles, but allowed the wife to remain there for another 60 days.  At the request of the husband’s counsel, the court ruled the home was to be maintained in the condition it was in.  When presenting its written ruling, the court also instructed the wife not to damage the home in any way, and it noted that if damage did occur, the court would consider contempt and address the damage.

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High-asset divorces are very complex and difficult matters.  It is not uncommon for one party to allege the other has either wasted or hidden assets.  Additionally, the standard calculation may not be an equitable way to determine the appropriate amount of support, so the court has some discretion to deviate from the standard if it considers the appropriate factors and makes findings of fact.

A Washington appeals court recently considered waste, separate property, and a possible deviation from the standard distribution calculation in In re Marriage of Hansen. The couple married in 2001, and the decree was issued in 2015.  The couple had two children.  The husband owned and operated a bail bond company, which was the couple’s primary source of income.  The wife did not work outside the home and had been financially dependent on her husband well before the marriage.

In 2013, the husband purchased another bail bond company, for which he paid partially with funds from shared retirement accounts.  The couple incurred early withdrawal fees and taxes of more than $120,000.

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In Washington criminal cases, the prosecution must disclose upon written demand the names and addresses of the people it “intends to call as witnesses . . .” and any expert witnesses it intends to call at trial, if that information is within its knowledge, possession, or control.  The Washington Court of Appeals recently considered whether it was permissible for the State to wait until the day of trial to name the actual witness in State v. Salgado-Mendoza.

After being arrested for DUI, the defendant voluntarily submitted to two breath tests.  Several months before his scheduled trial date, he requested that the State disclose information about its expert witnesses.  The State filed a witness list in December 2012, naming nine toxicologists, one of whom would testify.

The defendant filed a supplementary discovery demand about two weeks before trial, seeking the names of all the expert witnesses the state intended to call.  Three days before trial, he moved for the dismissal or exclusion of the toxicologist’s evidence.  He argued the State had committed governmental misconduct by failing to disclose who would testify, despite multiple requests.

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