Court Weighs in on Order to Surrender Weapons in a Washington DVPO Case

A Washington appellate court has confirmed that a superior court cannot refuse to enter an order to surrender weapons simply out of concern that doing so violates a respondent’s constitutional rights. In Medlin v. Miller, Division II of the Court of Appeals held that after 2023 amendments to the state’s firearm surrender statutes, issuing that kind of order does not, by itself, violate the Fourth or Fifth Amendment. For anyone seeking or responding to a domestic violence protection order in Washington, the decision restores a step the legislature meant courts to take.

The attorneys at Blair & Kim handle domestic violence protection order matters for both petitioners and respondents throughout the Seattle area, Bellevue, and the surrounding King, Pierce, and Snohomish County courts.

What the Court of Appeals decided in Medlin v. Miller

Jennifer Medlin sought a protection order against Andrew Miller in 2024, alleging that he had assaulted her and one of their sons and had access to roughly 35 firearms. A superior court commissioner found her the more credible witness and granted the order. When Medlin later asked the court to prohibit Miller from possessing weapons and to enter an order to surrender the weapons he already owned, the court did the first but refused the second.

The trial court relied on State v. Flannery, a 2022 decision that had found an earlier version of the surrender scheme unconstitutional, and worried that requiring surrender would expose Miller to self-incrimination and an unreasonable search. Division II reversed. It held that following the 2023 amendments, the mere issuance of a surrender order does not violate either the Fourth or Fifth Amendment, and it sent the case back so the superior court could apply the statute and decide whether surrender was warranted on these facts.

How Washington’s firearm surrender law changed after Flannery

The surrender scheme has been rewritten several times. The legislature created detailed procedures in 2019, then in 2021 added the first immunity provisions for respondents who hand over weapons. Flannery addressed the earlier framework and concluded that, without immunity, requiring a respondent to search their own home and surrender firearms raised serious Fourth and Fifth Amendment problems. After that ruling, many superior courts around the state stopped issuing surrender orders altogether.

The 2023 amendments were aimed directly at the self-incrimination concern. They broadened the immunity to cover not only the act of surrender but any evidence derived from it, extended that protection to potential prosecutions unrelated to the order, and required every surrender order to spell out those protections. Division One upheld the current scheme in In re Domestic Violence Protection Order of Montesi in 2025, and Division Three reached the same conclusion in an unpublished decision. Medlin now adds Division II to that line.

When a court must enter an order to surrender weapons

Entering a protection order does not automatically strip a respondent of every firearm. The statute sets specific triggers. A court must issue an order to surrender weapons when it grants a protection order and finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent used, displayed, or threatened to use a firearm or other dangerous weapon in a felony, or is otherwise ineligible to possess firearms. Even when no felony is involved, the court retains discretion to order surrender if it finds that a party’s possession presents a serious and imminent threat to public safety or to a particular person. Which provision applies is a fact-specific question, and in Medlin the appellate court left that determination to the superior court on remand.

If firearms are part of your case, the details of how surrender and immunity get handled can shape the result. Blair & Kim’s family law team works with people on both sides of these petitions and can explain how the rules apply to a specific situation.

What the immunity provisions mean for a respondent

The constitutional objection that stalled surrender orders after Flannery centered on self-incrimination, and the 2023 amendments answer it. Under RCW 9.41.801(9), the act of surrendering weapons, any testimony about the surrender, and information derived from either cannot be used against the respondent in most criminal prosecutions, with narrow exceptions for perjury, false statements, or failing to comply with the order. A respondent who believes surrender would still create a realistic threat of self-incrimination can raise that concern with the court, and the statute allows the showing to be made in a closed courtroom. If a genuine risk exists beyond what the immunity already covers, the court must give the prosecutor a chance to offer an immunity agreement covering the specific weapons at issue. If the prosecutor declines, the surrender order is narrowed to reach only the weapons that do not carry that risk.

One judge on the panel wrote separately, urging the court to reject Flannery‘s search-and-seizure reasoning outright rather than resting the decision on the immunity provisions. That concurrence is a signal that the reasoning in this area may keep developing, which is one reason domestic violence protection order cases involving firearms benefit from close attention to the current statute.

What Medlin v. Miller means for protection order cases around Puget Sound

Because Medlin is a published Division II decision, it binds superior courts within that division, which includes Pierce County. Division One reached the same conclusion in Montesi for the King County courts, and Division Three followed suit. Courts across the region are now aligned on the point: a respondent’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment concerns, standing alone, are no longer a valid reason to withhold a surrender order the statute otherwise calls for.

For a petitioner, a firearm surrender request tied to a well-supported protection order should be evaluated on the statute’s terms rather than turned aside on constitutional grounds. For a respondent, the immunity framework in RCW 9.41.801 becomes the place where rights are protected, and how a self-incrimination concern is raised can affect the scope of any order entered. Either way, the surrender question is now decided by the facts and the statutory criteria, not by a categorical constitutional objection.

To talk with Blair & Kim about a domestic violence protection order or a firearm surrender issue, contact our team or call (206) 622-6562. This article is informational only and is not legal advice. Every case is different, and past results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Firearm surrender and Washington protection orders: common questions

Can a domestic violence protection order require someone to give up their guns in Washington?

Yes, in defined circumstances. When a court grants a protection order, it must order the respondent to surrender weapons if it finds the respondent used, displayed, or threatened to use a weapon in a felony, or is otherwise barred from possessing firearms. The court may also order surrender when a party’s possession presents a serious and imminent threat to safety. Surrender is not automatic with every protection order.

Does an order to surrender weapons violate a respondent’s constitutional rights?

Under Medlin v. Miller and earlier Washington decisions, the current surrender statutes do not violate the Fourth or Fifth Amendment. The 2023 amendments added immunity provisions that keep the act of surrender from being used against the respondent in most criminal prosecutions.

What happens if surrendering weapons could incriminate the respondent?

The respondent can ask the court to consider whether surrender poses a realistic threat of self-incrimination, and can make that showing in a closed courtroom. If a genuine risk exists, the court gives the prosecutor an opportunity to offer immunity. If none is offered, the surrender order is limited to weapons that do not carry that risk.

Is this ruling binding in King County and Pierce County?

Medlin v. Miller is a published Division II decision, so it binds superior courts in that division, which includes Pierce County. Division One reached the same result in Montesi, so courts serving King County follow the same rule.